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Abstract
This thesis studies the learning problem of a set of agents connected via a general
social network. We address the question of how dispersed information spreads in social
networks and whether the information is efficiently aggregated in large societies. The
models developed in this thesis allow us to study the learning behavior of rational agents
embedded in complex networks.
We analyze the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic game where each agent
sequentially receives a signal about an underlying state of the world, observes the past
actions of a stochastically-generated neighborhood of individuals, and chooses one of
two possible actions. The stochastic process generating the neighborhoods defines the
network topology (social network).
We characterize equilibria for arbitrary stochastic and deterministic social networks
and characterize the conditions under which there will be asymptotic learning—that is,
the conditions under which, as the social network becomes large, the decisions of the
individuals converge (in probability) to the right action. We show that when private
beliefs are unbounded (meaning that the implied likelihood ratios are unbounded), there
will be asymptotic learning as long as there is some minimal amount of expansion in
observations. This result therefore establishes that, with unbounded private beliefs,
there will be asymptotic learning in almost all reasonable social networks. Furthermore,
we provide bounds on the speed of learning for some common network topologies. We
also analyze when learning occurs when the private beliefs are bounded. We show
that asymptotic learning does not occur in many classes of network topologies, but,
surprisingly, it happens in a family of stochastic networks that has infinitely many
agents observing the actions of neighbors that are not sufficiently persuasive.
Finally, we characterize equilibria in a generalized environment with heterogeneity of
preferences and show that, contrary to a nave intuition, greater diversity (heterogeneity)
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facilitates asymptotic learning when agents observe the full history of past actions. In
contrast, we show that heterogeneity of preferences hinders information aggregation
when each agent observes only the action of a single neighbor.
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Thesis Supervisor: Munther Dahleh
Title: Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Thesis Supervisor: Asuman Ozdaglar
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Aggregation of Information in Social Networks
How is dispersed and decentralized information held by a large number of individuals ag-
gregated? Imagine a situation in which each of a large number of individuals has a noisy
signal about an underlying state of the world. This state of the world might concern,
among other things, earning opportunities in a certain occupation, the quality of a new
product, the suitability of a particular political candidate for office or payoff-relevant ac-
tions taken by the government. If signals are unbiased, the combination—aggregation—
of the information of the individuals will be sufficient for the society to “learn” the true
underlying state. The above question can be formulated as the investigation of what
types of behaviors and communication structures will lead to this type of information
aggregation.
This thesis investigates the learning behavior of rational agents who are embedded in
a social network. We aim to understand under what conditions do rational individuals
learning from each others’ actions are able to correctly identify an underlying state. The
analysis of the spread of information in social networks has a diverse set of applications,
and some of the most interesting questions relate to how businesses can leverage social
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networks in order to improve their operations. For example, when should a firm rely
on viral (word-of-mouth) marketing to spread the news that its products are of high
quality? Should the publicity campaign used to convince consumers to see a good film
be fundamentally different than the one deployed for a worse movie? How do traditional
ads compare in effectiveness to the novel “social ads”, which simply show you information
about your friends’ purchases? Are there particular individuals that should be targeted
in order to maximize one’s influence on a social network?
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem provides a natural benchmark for information aggrega-
tion, where sincere (truthful) reporting of their information by each individual is suf-
ficient for aggregation of information by a law of large numbers argument (Condorcet,
1788). Against this background, a number of papers, most notably Bikchandani, Hirsh-
leifer and Welch (1992), Banerjee (1992) and Smith and Sorensen (2000), show how this
type of aggregation might fail in the context of the (perfect) Bayesian equilibrium of a
dynamic game: when individuals act sequentially, after observing the actions of all pre-
vious individuals (agents), many reasonable situations will lead to the wrong conclusion
with positive probability.
An important modeling assumption in these papers is that each individual observes
all past actions. In practice, individuals are situated in complex social networks, which
provide their main source of information. For example, Granovetter (1973), Montgomery
(1991), Munshi (2003) and Iaonnides and Loury (2004) document the importance of
information obtained from the social network of an individual for employment outcomes.
Besley and Case (1994), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Munshi (2004), and Udry and
Conley (2001) show the importance of the information obtained from social networks
for technology adoption. Jackson (2006, 2007) provides excellent surveys of the work on
the importance of social networks in many diverse situations. In this thesis, we address
how the structure of social networks, which determines the information that individuals
receive, affects equilibrium information aggregation.
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We start with the canonical sequential learning problem, except that instead of full
observation of past actions, we allow for a general social network connecting individuals.
More specifically, a large number of agents sequentially choose between two actions. An
underlying state determines the payoffs of these two actions. Each agent receives a
signal on which of these two actions yields a higher payoff. Preferences of all agents are
aligned in the sense that, given the underlying state of the world, they all prefer the
same action. The game is characterized by two features: (i) the signal structure, which
determines how informative the signals received by the individuals are; (ii) the social
network structure, which determines the observations of each individual in the game.
We model the social network structure as a stochastic process that determines each
individual’s neighborhood. Each individual only observes the (past) actions of agents
in his neighborhood. Motivated by the social network interpretation, throughout it is
assumed that each individual knows the identity of the agents in his neighborhood (e.g.,
he can distinguish whether the action observed is by a friend or neighbor or by some
outside party). Nevertheless, the realized neighborhood of each individual as well as his
private signal are private information.
We also refer to the stochastic process generating neighborhoods as the network
topology of this social network. For some of our results, it will be useful to distinguish
between deterministic and stochastic network topologies. With deterministic network
topologies, there is no uncertainty concerning the neighborhood of each individual and
these neighborhoods are common knowledge. With stochastic network topologies, there
is uncertainty about these neighborhoods.
The environment most commonly studied in the previous literature is the full obser-
vation network topology, which is the special case where all past actions are observed.
Another deterministic special case is the network topology where each individual ob-
serves the actions of the most recent M ≥ 1 individuals. Other relevant social networks
include stochastic topologies in which each individual observes a random subset of past
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actions, as well as those in which, with a high probability, each individual observes the
actions of some “influential” group of agents, who may be thought of as “leaders” or the
media.
We provide a systematic characterization of the conditions under which there will be
equilibrium information aggregation in social networks. We say that there is information
aggregation or equivalently asymptotic learning, when, in the limit as the size of the
social network becomes arbitrarily large, individual actions converge (in probability) to
the action that yields the higher payoff. We say that asymptotic learning fails if, as the
social network becomes large, the correct action is not chosen (or more formally, the
lim inf of the probability that the right action is chosen is strictly less than 1).
Two concepts turn out to be crucial in the study of information aggregation in social
networks. The first is whether the likelihood ratio implied by individual signals is always
bounded away from 0 and infinity.1 Smith and Sorensen (2000) refer to beliefs that sat-
isfy this property as bounded (private) beliefs. With bounded beliefs, there is a maximum
amount of information in any individual signal. In contrast, when there exist signals
with arbitrarily high and low likelihood ratios, (private) beliefs are unbounded. Whether
bounded or unbounded beliefs provide a better approximation to reality is partly an
interpretational and partly an empirical question. Smith and Sorensen’s main result is
that when each individual observes all past actions and private beliefs are unbounded,
information will be aggregated and the correct action will be chosen asymptotically. In
contrast, the results in Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), Banerjee (1992) and
Smith and Sorensen (2000) indicate that with bounded beliefs, there will not be asymp-
totic learning (or information aggregation). Instead, as emphasized by Bikchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) and Banerjee (1992), there will be “herding” or “infor-
mational cascades,” where individuals copy past actions and/or completely ignore their
own signals.
1The likelihood ratio is the ratio of the probabilities or the densities of a signal in one state relative
to the other. The bounded likelihood ratio condition was first introduced by Cover (1969).
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The second key concept is that of a network topology with expanding observations.
To describe this concept, let us first introduce another notion: a finite group of agents is
excessively influential if there exists an infinite number of agents who, with probability
uniformly bounded away from 0, observe only the actions of a subset of this group. For
example, a group is excessively influential if it is the source of all information (except
individual signals) for an infinitely large component of the social network. If there exists
an excessively influential group of individuals, then the social network has nonexpanding
observations, and conversely, if there exists no excessively influential group, the network
has expanding observations. This definition implies that most reasonable social networks
have expanding observations, and in particular, a minimum amount of “arrival of new
information ” in the social network is sufficient for the expanding observations property.2
For example, the environment studied in most of the previous work in this area, where
all past actions are observed, has expanding observations. Similarly, a social network
in which each individual observes one uniformly drawn individual from those who have
taken decisions in the past or a network in which each individual observes his immedi-
ate neighbor all feature expanding observations. Note also that a social network with
expanding observations need not be connected. For example, the network in which even-
numbered [odd-numbered] individuals only observe the past actions of even-numbered
[odd-numbered] individuals has expanding observations, but is not connected. A simple,
but typical, example of a network with nonexpanding observations is the one in which
all future individuals only observe the actions of the first K <∞ agents.
2Here, “arrival of new information” refers to the property that the probability of each individual
observing the action of some individual from the recent past converges to one as the social network
becomes arbitrarily large.
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1.2 Contributions
In this section, we introduce the main results of the thesis. Theorem 1 shows that there
is no asymptotic learning in networks with nonexpanding observations. This result is not
surprising, since information aggregation is not possible when the set of observations on
which (an infinite subset of) individuals can build their decisions remains limited forever.
Our most substantive result, Theorem 2, shows that when (private) beliefs are un-
bounded and the network topology is expanding, there will be asymptotic learning. This
is a very strong result (particularly if we consider unbounded beliefs to be a better ap-
proximation to reality than bounded beliefs), since almost all reasonable social networks
have the expanding observations property. This theorem, for example, implies that when
some individuals, such as “informational leaders,” are overrepresented in the neighbor-
hoods of future agents (and are thus “influential,” though not excessively so), learning
may slow down, but asymptotic learning will still obtain as long as private beliefs are
unbounded.
The idea of the proof of Theorem 2 is as follows. We first establish a strong improve-
ment principle under unbounded beliefs, whereby in a network where each individual has
a single agent in his neighborhood, he can receive a strictly higher payoff than this agent
and this improvement remains bounded away from zero as long as asymptotic learning
has not been achieved. We then show that the same insight applies when individuals
stochastically observe one or multiple agents (in particular, with multiple agents, the
improvement is no less than the case in which the individual observes a single agent from
the past). Finally, the property that the network topology has expanding observations
is sufficient for these improvements to accumulate to asymptotic learning.
In Theorems 3 and 4, we present results on the speed of convergence for some common
network topologies, assuming the private beliefs are unbounded. We derive conditions on
the private belief distribution that guarantee that the error rate decays polynomially fast.
In contrast, when each agent observe the action of a single, uniformly selected neighbor,
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the error rate decays subpolynomially. We show that the previously derived conditions
on the private belief distribution guarantee logarithmic decay of the probability of error
in the case of uniform sampling.
Theorem 5 presents a partial converse to Theorem 2. It shows that for the most
common deterministic and stochastic networks, bounded private beliefs are incompatible
with asymptotic learning. It therefore generalizes existing results on asymptotic learning,
for example, those in Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), Banerjee (1992), and
Smith and Sorensen (2000) to general networks.
One of our more surprising results is Theorem 6, which establishes that asymptotic
learning is possible with bounded private beliefs for certain stochastic network topologies.
In these cases, there is sufficient arrival of new information (incorporated into the “social
belief”) because some agents make decisions on the basis of limited observations. As
a consequence, even bounded private beliefs may aggregate and lead to asymptotic
learning. This finding is particularly important, since it shows how moving away from
simple network structures has major implications for equilibrium learning dynamics.
Our last set of results address the question of heterogeneity of preferences. In most
of the thesis, we assume that all agents have the same utility function and they differ
only in their knowledge of the state of the world. However, in most real-life situations,
idiosyncratic preferences serve as a confounding factor in learning. For example, when
an individual buys a piece of equipment, she will typically take into account factors such
as their belief about the product quality as well as their particular needs. When learning
from the actions of peers, an agent has to distinguish between perceived quality (belief
about the state) and the effect of individual preferences. Therefore, the na¨ıve intuition
is that learning is harder in the presence of heterogeneous preferences. In Theorem 7,
we show that this is indeed the case when each agent can only observe the actions of one
neighbor. However, when agents observe the full history of actions, diverse preferences
have the opposite effect. Theorem 8 shows that asymptotic learning can occur in the
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full observation topology even under bounded beliefs, if the preferences are sufficiently
diverse.
1.3 Related Literature
The literature on social learning is vast. Roughly speaking, the literature can be sep-
arated according to two criteria: whether learning is Bayesian or myopic, and whether
individuals learn from communication of exact signals or from the payoffs of others, or
simply from observing others’ actions. Typically, Bayesian models focus on learning
from past actions, while most, but not all, myopic learning models focus on learning
from communication.
Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) and Banerjee (1992) started the litera-
ture on learning in situations in which individuals are Bayesian and observe past actions.
Smith and Sorensen (2000) provide the most comprehensive and complete analysis of
this environment. Their results and the importance of the concepts of bounded and un-
bounded beliefs, which they introduced, have already been discussed in the introduction
and will play an important role in our analysis in the thesis. Other important contribu-
tions in this area include, among others, Welch (1992), Lee (1993), Chamley and Gale
(1994), and Vives (1997). An excellent general discussion is contained in Bikchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch (1998). These papers typically focus on the special case of full
observation network topology in terms of our general model.
The two papers most closely related to ours are Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) and
Smith and Sorensen (1998). Both of these papers study social learning with sampling of
past actions. In Banerjee and Fudenberg, there is a continuum of agents and the focus
is on proportional sampling (whereby individuals observe a “representative” sample of
the overall population). They establish that asymptotic learning is achieved under mild
assumptions as long as the sample size is no smaller than two. The existence of a
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continuum of agents is important for this result since it ensures that the fraction of
individuals with different posteriors evolves deterministically. Smith and Sorensen, on
the other hand, consider a related model with a countable number of agents. In their
model, as in ours, the evolution of beliefs is stochastic. Smith and Sorensen provide
conditions under which asymptotic learning takes place.
A crucial difference between Banerjee and Fudenberg and Smith and Sorensen, on
the one hand, and our work, on the other, is the information structure. These papers
assume that “samples are unordered” in the sense that individuals do not know the
identity of the agents they have observed. In contrast, as mentioned above, our setup
is motivated by a social network and assumes that individuals have stochastic neigh-
borhoods, but know the identity of the agents in their realized neighborhood. We view
this as a better approximation to learning in social networks. In addition to its descrip-
tive realism, this assumption leads to a sharper characterization of the conditions under
which asymptotic learning occurs. For example, in Smith and Sorensen’s environment,
asymptotic learning fails whenever an individual is “oversampled,” in the sense of being
overrepresented in the samples of future agents. In contrast, in our environment, asymp-
totic learning occurs when the network topology features expanding observations (and
private beliefs are unbounded). Expanding observations is a much weaker requirement
than “non-oversampling.” For example, when each individual observes agent 1 and a
randomly chosen agent from his predecessors, the network topology satisfies expanding
observations, but there is oversampling.3
Other recent work on social learning includes Celen and Kariv (2004) who study
Bayesian learning when each individual observes his immediate predecessor, Gale and
Kariv (2003) who generalize the payoff equalization result of Bala and Goyal (1998) in
connected social networks (discussed below) to Bayesian learning, and Callander and
Horner (2006), who show that it may be optimal to follow the actions of agents that
3This also implies that, in the terminology of Bala and Goyal, a “royal family” precludes learning
in Smith and Sorensen’s model, but not in ours, see below.
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deviate from past average behavior.
The second branch of the literature focuses on non-Bayesian learning, typically with
agents using some reasonable rules of thumb. This literature considers both learning
from past actions and from payoffs (or directly from beliefs). Early papers in this
literature include Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995), which show how rule-of-thumb
learning can converge to the true underlying state in some simple environments. The
papers most closely related to our work in this genre are Bala and Goyal (1998, 2001),
DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) and Golub and Jackson (2007). These papers
study non-Bayesian learning over an arbitrary, connected social network, in a context
where agents act repeatedly but myopically. Bala and Goyal (1998) establish the impor-
tant and intuitive payoff equalization result that, asymptotically, each individual must
receive a payoff equal to that of an arbitrary individual in his “social network,” since
otherwise he could copy the behavior of this other individual. This principle can be
traced back, in the engineering literature, to the results on asymptotic agreement by
Borkar and Varaiya (1982) and Tsitsikis and Athans (1984). A similar, but strength-
ened, “imitation” intuition plays an important role in our proof of asymptotic learning
with unbounded beliefs and expanding observations.
DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel and Golub and Jackson also study similar environ-
ments and derive consensus-type results, whereby individuals in the connected compo-
nents of the social network will converge to similar beliefs. They provide characterization
results on which individuals in the social network will be influential and investigate the
likelihood that the consensus opinion will coincide with the true underlying state. Golub
and Jackson, in particular, show that social networks where some individuals are “influ-
ential” in the sense of being connected to a large number of people make learning more
difficult or impossible. A similar result is also established in Bala and Goyal, where
they show that the presence of a royal family, i.e., a small set of individuals observed
by everyone, precludes learning. This both complements and contrasts with our results.
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In our environment, an excessively influential group of individuals prevents learning,
but influential agents in Golub and Jackson’s sense or Bala and Goyal’s royal family
are not excessively influential and still allow asymptotic learning. This is because with
Bayesian updating over a social network, individuals recognize who the oversampled
individuals or the royal family are and accordingly adjust the weight they give to their
action/information.
The literature on the information aggregation role of elections is also related, since
it revisits the original context of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem. This literature includes,
among others, the papers by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996, 1997), McLennan (1998), Myerson (1998, 2000), and Young (1988). Most of these
papers investigate whether dispersed information will be accurately aggregated in large
elections. Although the focus on information aggregation is common, the set of issues
and the methods of analysis are very different, particularly since, in these models, there
are no sequential decisions.
Finally, there is also a literature in engineering, which studies related problems, espe-
cially motivated by aggregation of information collected by decentralized sensors. The
typical objective in this literature is to maximize the probability that a given agent,
called the fusion center, estimates correctly the state of the world. The agents use de-
cision rules chosen by a social planner, rather than equilibrium decision rules. Cover
(1969) shows that the fusion center asymptotically estimate the state in the case of
unbounded likelihood ratios and each agent observing only the action of their immedi-
ate predecessor. The work by Papastavrou and Athans (1990) contains a result that is
equivalent to the characterization of asymptotic learning in this same network topology.
Tay, Tsitsiklis and Win (2008) analyze the problem of information aggregation for se-
quences of trees in the limit as the number of leaves (agents that only know their private
signals) goes to infinity.
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1.4 Organization
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the model, the solution concept
and the decomposition lemma that describes the agents’ decisions in terms of their social
and private beliefs. Chapter 3 introduces the concept of expanding observations and
shows that it is a necessary condition for asymptotic learning and a sufficient condition
on the network in the case where private beliefs are unbounded. Chapter 4 contains
upper and lower bounds on the speed of learning. Chapter 5 presents the results on
learning under the assumption of bounded private beliefs. Chapter 6 extends the model
to include diverse preferences and Chapter 7 concludes the work.
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Chapter 2
The Model
2.1 Formulation
A countably infinite number of agents (individuals), indexed by n ∈ N, sequentially
make a single decision each. The payoff of agent n depends on an underlying state of
the world θ and his decision. To simplify the notation and the exposition, we assume
that both the underlying state and decisions are binary. In particular, the decision of
agent n is denoted by xn ∈ {0, 1} and the underlying state is θ ∈ {0, 1}. The payoff of
agent n is
un (xn, θ) =
 1 if xn = θ0 if xn 6= θ.
Again to simplify notation, we assume that both values of the underlying state are
equally likely, so that P(θ = 0) = P(θ = 1) = 1/2.
The state θ is unknown. Each agent n ∈ N forms beliefs about this state from a
private signal sn ∈ S (where S is a metric space or simply a Euclidean space) and from
his observation of the actions of other agents. Conditional on the state of the world θ,
the signals are independently generated according to a probability measure Fθ. We refer
to the pair of measures (F0,F1) as the signal structure of the model. We assume that F0
23
and F1 are absolutely continuous with respect to each other, which immediately implies
that no signal is fully revealing about the underlying state. We also assume that F0 and
F1 are not identical, so that some signals are informative. These two assumptions on
the signal structure are maintained throughout the paper and will not be stated in the
theorems explicitly.
In contrast to much of the literature on social learning, we assume that agents do
not necessarily observe all previous actions. Instead, they observe the actions of other
agents according to the structure of the social network. To introduce the notion of a social
network, let us first define a neighborhood. Each agent n observes the decisions of the
agents in his (stochastically-generated) neighborhood, denoted by B(n).1 Since agents
can only observe actions taken previously, B(n) ⊆ {1, 2, ..., n− 1}. Each neighborhood
B(n) is generated according to an arbitrary probability distribution Qn over the set of
all subsets of {1, 2, ..., n − 1}. We impose no special assumptions on the sequence of
distributions {Qn}n∈N except that the draws from each Qn are independent from each
other for all n and from the realizations of private signals. The sequence of probability
distributions {Qn}n∈N is the network topology of the social network formed by the agents.
The network topology is common knowledge, whereas the realized neighborhood B(n)
and the private signal sn are the private information of agent n. We say that {Qn}n∈N
is a deterministic network topology if the probability distribution Qn is a degenerate
(Dirac) distribution for all n. Otherwise, that is, if {Qn} for some n is nondegenerate,
{Qn}n∈N is a stochastic network topology.
A social network consists of a network topology {Qn}n∈N and a signal structure
(F0,F1).
Example 1 Here are some examples of network topologies.
1. If {Qn}n∈N assigns probability 1 to neighborhood {1, 2..., n− 1} for each n ∈ N,
1If n′ ∈ B(n), then agent n not only observes the action of n′, but also knows the identity of this
agent.
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then the network topology is identical to the canonical one studied in the previous
literature where each agent observes all previous actions (e.g., Banerjee (1992),
Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), Smith and Sorensen (2000)).
2. If {Qn}n∈N assigns probability 1/(n − 1) to each one of the subsets of size 1 of
{1, 2..., n− 1} for each n ∈ N, then we have a network topology of random sampling
of one agent from the past.
3. If {Qn}n∈N assigns probability 1 to neighborhood {n− 1} for each n ∈ N, then
we have a network topology where each individual only observes his immediate
neighbor (also considered in a different context in the engineering literature by
Papastavrou and Athans (1990)).
4. If {Qn}n∈N assigns probability 1 to neighborhoods that are subsets of {1, 2, ..., K}
for each n ∈ N for some K ∈ N. In this case, all agents observe the actions of at
most K agents.
5. Figure 2.1 depicts an arbitrary stochastic topology until agent 7. The thickness of
the lines represents the probability with which a particular agent will observe the
action of the corresponding preceding agent.
Given the description above, it is evident that the information set In of agent n is
given by her signal sn, her neighborhood B(n), and all decisions of agents in B(n), that
is,
In = {sn, B(n), xk for all k ∈ B(n)}. (2.1)
The set of all possible information sets of agent n is denoted by In. A strategy for
individual n is a mapping σn : In → {0, 1} that selects a decision for each possible
information set. A strategy profile is a sequence of strategies σ = {σn}n∈N. We use the
standard notation σ−n = {σ1, . . . , σn−1, σn+1, . . .} to denote the strategies of all agents
other than n and also (σn, σ−n) for any n to denote the strategy profile σ. Given a
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Figure 2-1: The figure illustrates the world from the perspective of agent 7. Agent 7
knows her private signal s7, her realized neighborhood, B(7) = {4, 6} and the decisions
of agents 4 and 6, x4 and x6. She also knows the probabilistic model {Qn}n<7 for
neighborhoods of all agents n < 7.
strategy profile σ, the sequence of decisions {xn}n∈N is a stochastic process and we
denote the measure generated by this stochastic process by Pσ.
Definition 1 A strategy profile σ∗ is a pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
of this game of social learning if for each n ∈ N, σ∗n maximizes the expected payoff of
agent n given the strategies of other agents σ∗−n.
In the rest of the thesis, we focus on pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, and
simply refer to this as “equilibrium” (without the pure-strategy and the Perfect Bayesian
qualifiers).
Given a strategy profile σ, the expected payoff of agent n from action xn = σn(In) is
simply Pσ(xn = θ | In). Therefore, for any equilibrium σ∗, we have
σ∗n(In) ∈ argmax
y∈{0,1}
P(y,σ∗−n)(y = θ | In). (2.2)
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It is worthwhile to highlight that the decision rule above is indeed the result of a
strategic equilibrium. At first glance, the behavior described by Eq. (2.2) does not
appear to be truly game-theoretical as agents are not strategic about the information
they reveal through their actions. However, agents are in fact strategic with respect to
the actions they observe: when selecting their actions, they take into consideration that
all other agents are utility-maximizers, and all other agents realize that every one is a
utility-maximizer and so on.
We denote the set of equilibria (pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria) of the
game by Σ∗. It is clear that Σ∗ is nonempty. Given the sequence of strategies {σ∗1, . . . , σ∗n−1},
the maximization problem in (2.2) has a solution for each agent n and each In ∈ In.
Proceeding inductively, and choosing either one of the actions in case of indifference
determines an equilibrium. We note the existence of equilibrium here.
Proposition 1 There exists a pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Our main focus is whether equilibrium behavior will lead to information aggregation.
This is captured by the notion of asymptotic learning, which is introduced next.
Definition 2 Given a signal structure (F0,F1) and a network topology {Qn}n∈N, we say
that asymptotic learning occurs in equilibrium σ if xn converges to θ in probability
(according to measure Pσ), that is,
lim
n→∞
Pσ(xn = θ) = 1.
Notice that asymptotic learning requires that the probability of taking the correct
action converges to 1. Therefore, asymptotic learning will fail when, as the network
becomes large, the limit inferior of the probability of all individuals taking the correct
action is strictly less than 1.
Our goal in Chapters 3 and 5 is to characterize conditions on social networks—on
signal structures and network topologies—that ensure asymptotic learning.
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2.2 Equilibrium Strategies
In this section, we provide a characterization of equilibrium strategies. We show that
equilibrium decision rules of individuals can be decomposed into two parts, one that
only depends on an individual’s private signal, and the other that is a function of the
observations of past actions. We also show why a full characterization of individual
decisions is nontrivial and motivate an alternative proof technique, relying on developing
bounds on improvements in the probability of the correct decisions, that will be used in
the rest of our analysis.
2.2.1 Characterization of Individual Decisions
Our first lemma shows that individual decisions can be characterized as a function of
the sum of two posteriors. These posteriors play an important role in our analysis. We
will refer to these posteriors as the individual’s private belief and the social belief.
Lemma 1 Let σ ∈ Σ∗ be an equilibrium of the game. Let In ∈ In be an information set
of agent n. Then, the decision of agent n, xn = σ(In), satisfies
xn =
 1, if Pσ(θ = 1 | sn) + Pσ
(
θ = 1 | B(n), xk, k ∈ B(n)
)
> 1,
0, if Pσ(θ = 1 | sn) + Pσ
(
θ = 1 | B(n), xk, k ∈ B(n)
)
< 1,
and xn ∈ {0, 1} otherwise.
Proof. We prove that if
Pσ(θ = 1 | sn) + Pσ
(
θ = 1 | B(n), xk for all k ∈ B(n)
)
> 1, (2.3)
28
then xn = 1. The proofs of the other clause follows the same line of argument. We first
show that Eq. (2.3) holds if and only if
Pσ(θ = 1 | In) > 1/2, (2.4)
therefore implying that xn = 1 by the equilibrium condition [cf. Eq. (2.2)]. By Bayes’
Rule, Eq. (2.4) is equivalent to
Pσ(θ = 1 | In) = dPσ(In | θ = 1)Pσ(θ = 1)∑1
j=0 dPσ(In | θ = j)Pσ(θ = j)
=
dPσ(In | θ = 1)∑1
j=0 dPσ(In | θ = j)
> 1/2, (2.5)
where the second equality follows from the assumption that states 0 and 1 are equally
likely. Hence, Eq. (2.4) holds if and only if
dPσ(In | θ = 1) > dPσ(In | θ = 0). (2.6)
Conditional on state θ, the private signals and the observed decisions are independent,
i.e.,
dPσ(In | θ = j) = dPσ(sn | θ = j)Pσ(B(n), xk, k ∈ B(n)|θ = j).
Combining the preceding two relations, it follows that Eq. (2.6) is equivalent to
Pσ(B(n), xk, k ∈ B(n) | θ = 1)∑1
j=0 Pσ(B(n), xk, k ∈ B(n) | θ = j)
>
dPσ(sn | θ = 0)∑1
j=0 dPσ(sn | θ = j)
.
Since both states are equally likely, this can be rewritten as
Pσ(B(n), xk, k ∈ B(n) | θ = 1)Pσ(θ = 1)∑1
j=0 Pσ(B(n), xk, k ∈ B(n) | θ = j)Pσ(θ = j)
>
dPσ(sn | θ = 0)Pσ(θ = 0)∑1
j=0 dPσ(sn | θ = j)Pσ(θ = j)
.
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Applying Bayes’ Rule on both sides of Eq. (2.7), we see that the preceding relation is
identical to
Pσ(θ = 1 | B(n), xk, k ∈ B(n)) > Pσ(θ = 0 | sn) = 1− Pσ(θ = 1 | sn),
completing the proof.
The lemma above establishes an additive decomposition in the equilibrium decision
rule between the information obtained from the private signal of the individual and from
the observations of others’ actions (in his neighborhood). The next definition formally
distinguishes between the two components of an individual’s information.
Definition 3 We refer to the probability Pσ(θ = 1 | sn) as the private belief of agent
n, and the probability
Pσ
(
θ = 1
∣∣ B(n), xk for all k ∈ B(n)) ,
as the social belief of agent n.
Notice that the social belief depends on n since it is a function of the (realized)
neighborhood of agent n.
Lemma 1 and Definition 3 imply that the equilibrium decision rule for agent n ∈ N
is equivalent to choosing xn = 1 when the sum of his private and social beliefs is greater
than 1. Consequently, the properties of private and social beliefs will shape equilibrium
learning behavior. In the next subsection, we provide a characterization for the dynamic
behavior of private beliefs, which will be used in the analysis of the evolution of decision
rules.
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2.2.2 Private Beliefs
In this subsection, we study properties of private beliefs. Note that the private belief is
a function of the private signal s ∈ S and is not a function of the strategy profile σ since
it does not depend on the decisions of other agents. We represent probabilities that do
not depend on the strategy profile by P. We use the notation pn to represent the private
belief of agent n, i.e.,
pn = P(θ = 1 | sn).
The next lemma follows from a simple application of Bayes’ Rule.
Lemma 2 For any n and any signal sn ∈ S, the private belief pn of agent n is given by
pn =
(
1 +
dF0
dF1
(sn)
)−1
. (2.7)
In the lemma above, dF0/dF1 denotes the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the measures
F0 and F1 (recall that these are absolutely continuous with respect to each other). If F0
and F1 have densities, then for each j ∈ {0, 1}, dFj can be replaced by the density of
Fj. If both measures have atoms at some s ∈ S, then dF0/dF1(s) = F0(s)/F1(s).
We next define the support of a private belief. In our subsequent analysis, we will see
that properties of the support of private beliefs play a key role in asymptotic learning
behavior.
Definition 4 The signal structure has bounded private beliefs if there exists some
0 < m, M <∞ such that the Radon-Nikodym derivative dF0/dF1 satisfies
m <
dF0
dF1
(s) < M,
for almost all s ∈ S under measure (F0 + F1)/2. The signal structure has unbounded
private beliefs if the infimum of the support of dF0/dF1(s) is 0 and the supremum of
the support of dF0/dF1(s) is ∞ under measure (F0 + F1)/2.
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Bounded private beliefs imply that there is a maximum amount of information that
an individual can derive from his private signal. Conversely, unbounded private beliefs
correspond to a situation where an agent can receive an arbitrarily strong signal about
the underlying state. Smith and Sorensen (2000) show that, in the special case of full
observation network topology, i.e., B(n) = {1, ..., n − 1} for every agent n ∈ N, there
will be asymptotic learning if the private beliefs are unbounded and, conversely, there
will not asymptotic learning if the private beliefs are bounded. In this thesis, we do
not analyze the case where there are arbitrarily strong signals in favor of one state, but
not in favor of the other. Such a scenario would occur, for example, if the support of
dF0/dF1(s) is (0,M) for some M <∞.
Since the pn are identically distributed for all n (which follows by the assumption
that the private signals sn are identically distributed), in the following, we will use agent
1’s private belief p1 to define the support and the conditional distributions of private
beliefs.
Definition 5 The support of the private beliefs is the interval [β, β], where the end
points of the interval are given by
β = inf {r ∈ [0, 1] | P(p1 ≤ r) > 0}, and β = sup {r ∈ [0, 1] | P(p1 ≤ r) < 1}.
Combining Lemma 2 with Definition 4, we see that beliefs are unbounded if and
only if β = 1 − β = 0. When the private beliefs are bounded, there is a maximum
informativeness to any signal. When they are unbounded, agents may receive arbitrarily
strong signals favoring either state (this follows from the assumption that (F0,F1) are
absolutely continuous with respect to each other). When both β > 0 and β < 1, private
beliefs are bounded.
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We represent the conditional distribution of a private belief given the underlying
state by Gj for each j ∈ {0, 1}, i.e.,
Gj(r) = P(p1 ≤ r | θ = j). (2.8)
We say that a pair of distributions (G0,G1) are private belief distributions if there exist
some signal space S and conditional private signal distributions (F0,F1) such that the
conditional distributions of the private beliefs are given by (G0,G1). The next lemma
presents key relations for private belief distributions.
Lemma 3 For any private belief distributions (G0,G1), the following relations hold.
(a) For all r ∈ (0, 1), we have
dG0
dG1
(r) =
1− r
r
.
(b) We have
G0(r) ≥
(
1− r
r
)
G1(r) +
r − z
2
G1 (z) for all 0 < z < r < 1,
1−G1(r) ≥ (1−G0(r))
(
r
1− r
)
+
w − r
2
(1−G1(w)) for all 0 < r < w < 1.
(c) The ratio G0(r)/G1(r) is nonincreasing in r and G0(r)/G1(r) > 1 for all r ∈ (β, β).
Proof.
(a) By the definition of a private belief, we have for any pn ∈ (0, 1),
P(θ = 1|sn) = P(θ = 1|pn).
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Using Bayes’ Rule, it follows that
pn = Pσ(θ = 1|pn) = dP(pn|θ = 1)P(θ = 1)∑1
j=0 dP(pn|θ = j)P(θ = j)
=
dP(pn|θ = 1)∑1
j=0 dP(pn|θ = j)
=
dG1(pn)∑1
j=0 dGj(pn)
.
Because of the assumption that no signal is completely informative, i.e., pn /∈ {0, 1}, we
can rewrite this equation as
dG0
dG1
(pn) =
1− pn
pn
,
completing the proof.
(b) For any p ∈ (0, 1),
G0(p) =
∫ p
r=0
dG0(r) =
∫ p
r=0
1− r
r
dG1(r) =
(
1− p
p
)
G1(p) +
∫ p
r=0
(
1
r
− 1
p
)
dG1(r),
where the second equality follows from part (a) of this lemma. We can provide a lower
bound on the last integral as
∫ p
r=0
(
1
r
− 1
p
)
dG1(r) ≥
∫ z
r=0
(
1
r
− 1
p
)
dG1(r)
≥
∫ z
r=0
(
1
z
− 2
z + p
)
dG1(r) ≥ p− z
2
G1 (z) ,
for any z ∈ (0, p). Equivalently, the second relation is obtained by
1−G1(p) =
∫ 1
r=p
dG1(r) =
∫ 1
r=p
r
1− rdG0(r)
= (1−G0(p))
(
p
1− p
)
+
∫ 1
r=p
(
r
1− r −
p
1− p
)
dG0(r),
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where the following bound is valid for any p < w < 1,
∫ 1
r=p
(
r
1− r −
p
1− p
)
dG0(r) ≥
∫ 1
r=w
(
r
1− r −
p
1− p
)
dG0(r)
≥
∫ 1
r=w
(
w
1− w −
p+ w
2− p− w
)
dG0(r) ≥ w − p
2
(1−G0(w)).
(c) From part (a), we have for any r ∈ (0, 1),
G0(r) =
∫ r
x=0
dG0(x) =
∫ r
x=0
(
1− x
x
)
dG1(x)
≥
∫ r
x=0
(
1− r
r
)
dG1(x) =
(
1− r
r
)
G1(r). (2.9)
Using part (a) again,
d
(
G0(r)
G1(r)
)
=
dG0(r)G1(r)−G0(r)dG1(r)
(G1(r))2
=
dG1(r)
(G1(r))2
[(
1− r
r
)
G1(r)−G0(r)
]
.
Since G1(r) > 0 for r > β, dG1(r) ≥ 0 and the term in brackets above is non-positive
by Eq. (2.9), we have
d
(
G0(r)
G1(r)
)
≤ 0,
thus proving the ratio G0(r)/G1(r) is non-increasing.
We now show that
G0(r) ≥ G1(r) for all r ∈ [0, 1]. (2.10)
From Eq. (2.9), we obtain that Eq. (2.10) is true for r ≤ 1/2. For r > 1/2,
1−G0(r) =
∫ 1
x=r
dG0(x) =
∫ 1
x=r
(
1− x
x
)
dG1(x) ≤
∫ 1
x=r
dG1(x) = 1−G1(r),
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thus proving Eq. (2.10).
We proceed to prove the second part of the lemma. Suppose G0(r)/G1(r) = 1 for
some r < β. Suppose first r ∈ (1/2, β). Then,
G0(1) = G0(r) +
∫ 1
x=r
dG0(x)
= G1(r) +
∫ 1
x=r
dG0(x)
= G1(r) +
∫ 1
x=r
(
1− x
x
)
dG1(x)
≥ G1(r) +
(
1− r
r
)∫ 1
x=r
dG1(x)
≥ G1(r) +
(
1− r
r
)
[1−G1(r)] ,
which yields a contradiction unless G1(r) = 1. However, G1(r) = 1 implies r ≥ β – also a
contradiction. Now, suppose r ∈ (β, 1/2]. Since the ratio G0(r)/G1(r) is non-increasing,
this implies that for all x ∈ (r, 1], G0(x)/G1(x) ≤ 1. Combined with Eq. (2.10), this
yields G0(x)/G1(x) = 1 for all x ∈ (r, 1], which yields a contradiction for x ∈ (1/2, β).
The lemma above establishes several important relationships that are used through-
out the thesis. Part (a) establishes a basic relation for private belief distributions, which
is used in some of the proofs below. The inequalities presented in part (b) of this lemma
play an important role in quantifying how much information an individual obtains from
his private signal. Part (c) will be used in our analysis of learning with bounded beliefs.
2.2.3 Social Beliefs
In this subsection, we illustrate the difficulties involved in determining equilibrium learn-
ing in general social networks. In particular, we show that social beliefs, as defined in
Definition 3, may be nonmonotone, in the sense that additional observations of xn = 1
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Figure 2-2: The figure illustrates a deterministic topology in which the social beliefs are
nonmonotone.
in the neighborhood of an individual may reduce the social belief (i.e., the posterior
derived from past observations that xn = 1 is the correct action).
The following example establishes this point. Suppose the private signals are such
that G0(r) = 2r − r2 and G1(r) = r2, which is a pair of private belief distributions
(G0,G1). Suppose the network topology is deterministic and for the first eight agents,
it has the following structure: B(1) = ∅, B(2) = ... = B(7) = {1} and B(8) = {1, ..., 7}
(see Figure 2-2).
For this social network, agent 1 has 3/4 probability of making a correct decision in
either state of the world. If agent 1 chooses the action that yields a higher payoff (i.e.,
the correct decision), then agents 2 to 7 each have 15/16 probability of choosing the
correct decision. However, if agent 1 fails to choose the correct decision, then agents 2
to 7 have a 7/16 probability of choosing the correct decision. Now suppose agents 1 to
4 choose action xn = 0, while agents 5 to 7 choose xn = 1. The probability of this event
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happening in each state of the world is:
Pσ(x1 = ... = x4 = 0, x5 = x6 = x7 = 1|θ = 0) = 3
4
(
15
16
)3(
1
16
)3
=
10125
226
,
Pσ(x1 = ... = x4 = 0, x5 = x6 = x7 = 1|θ = 1) = 1
4
(
9
16
)3(
7
16
)3
=
250047
226
.
Using Bayes’ Rule, the social belief of agent 8 is given by
[
1 +
10125
250047
]−1
w 0.961.
Now, consider a change in x1 from 0 to 1, while keeping all decisions as they are.
Then,
Pσ(x1 = 1, x2 = x3 = x4 = 0, x5 = x6 = x7 = 1|θ = 0) = 1
4
(
7
16
)3(
9
16
)3
=
250047
226
,
Pσ(x1 = 1, x2 = x3 = x4 = 0, x5 = x6 = x7 = 1|θ = 1) = 3
4
(
1
16
)3(
15
16
)3
=
10125
226
.
This leads to a social belief of agent 8 given by
[
1 +
250047
10125
]−1
w 0.039.
Therefore, this example has established that when x1 changes from 0 to 1, agent 8’s
social belief declines from 0.961 to 0.039. That is, while the agent strongly believes the
state is 1 when x1 = 0, he equally strongly believes the state is 0 when x1 = 1. This
happens because when half of the agents in {2, . . . , 7} choose action 0 and the other half
choose action 1, agent n places a high probability to the event that x1 6= θ. This leads
to a nonmonotonicity in social beliefs.
Since such nonmonotonicities cannot be ruled out in general, standard approaches
to characterizing equilibrium behavior cannot be used. Instead, in the next section, we
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use an alternative approach, which develops a lower bound to the probability that an
individual will make the correct decision relative to agents in his neighborhood.
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Chapter 3
The Case of Unbounded Private
Beliefs
In this chapter, we present a property called expanding observations and show that it is a
necessary condition for asymptotic learning. We also prove that this property provides a
full characterization of asymptotic learning under the assumption of unbounded private
beliefs.
3.1 Expanding Observations as a Necessary Condi-
tion for Learning
We introduce a property of the network topology that is a requirement for asymptotic
learning. Intuitively, for asymptotic learning to occur, the information that each agent
receives from other agents should not be confined to a bounded subset of agents. This
property is established in the following definition. For this definition and throughout
the thesis, if the set B(n) is empty, we set maxb∈B(n) b = 0.
Definition 6 The network topology has expanding observations if for all K ∈ N,
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we have
lim
n→∞
Qn
(
max
b∈B(n)
b < K
)
= 0.
If the network topology does not satisfy this property, then we say it has nonexpanding
observations.
Recall that the neighborhood of agent n is a random variable B(n) (with values in the
set of subsets of {1, 2, ..., n−1}) and distributed according to Qn. Therefore, maxb∈B(n) b
is a random variable that takes values in {0, 1, ..., n − 1}. The expanding observations
condition can be restated as the sequence of random variables {maxb∈B(n) b}n∈N converg-
ing to infinity in probability. Similarly, it follows from the preceding definition that the
network topology has nonexpanding observations if and only if there exists some K ∈ N
and some scalar  > 0 such that
lim sup
n→∞
Qn
(
max
b∈B(n)
b < K
)
≥ .
An alternative restatement of this definition might clarify its meaning. Let us refer to
a finite set of individuals C as excessively influential if there exists a subsequence of
agents who, with probability uniformly bounded away from zero, observe the actions of
a subset of C. Then, the network topology has nonexpanding observations if and only
if there exists an excessively influential group of agents. Note also that if there is a
minimum amount of arrival of new information in the network, so that the probability
of an individual observing some other individual from the recent past goes to one as the
network becomes large, then the network topology will feature expanding observations.
This discussion therefore highlights that the requirement that a network topology has
expanding observations is quite mild and most social networks satisfy this requirement.
When the topology has nonexpanding observations, there is a subsequence of agents
that draws information from the first K decisions with positive probability (uniformly
bounded away from 0). It is then intuitive that network topologies with nonexpanding
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observations will preclude asymptotic learning. Our first theorem states this result.
Theorem 1 Assume that the network topology {Qn}n∈N has nonexpanding observations.
Then, there exists no equilibrium σ ∈ Σ∗ with asymptotic learning.
Proof. Suppose that the network has nonexpanding observations. This implies that
there exists some K ∈ N,  > 0, and a subsequence of agents N such that for all n ∈ N ,
Qn
(
max
b∈B(n)
b < K
)
≥ . (3.1)
For any such agent n ∈ N , we have
Pσ(xn = θ) = Pσ
(
xn = θ
∣∣∣ max
b∈B(n)
b < K
)
Qn
(
max
b∈B(n)
b < K
)
+ Pσ
(
xn = θ
∣∣∣ max
b∈B(n)
b ≥ K
)
Qn
(
max
b∈B(n)
b ≥ K
)
≤ Pσ
(
xn = θ
∣∣∣ max
b∈B(n)
b < K
)
Qn
(
max
b∈B(n)
b < K
)
+Qn
(
max
b∈B(n)
b ≥ K
)
≤ 1− + Pσ
(
xn = θ
∣∣∣ max
b∈B(n)
b < K
)
, (3.2)
where the second inequality follows from Eq. (3.1).
Given some equilibrium σ ∈ Σ∗ and agent n, we define zn as the decision that
maximizes the conditional probability of making a correct decision given the private
signals and neighborhoods of the first K − 1 agents and agent n, i.e.,
zn = argmax
y∈{0,1}
Py,σ−n(y = θ | si, B(i), for i = 1, . . . , K − 1, n). (3.3)
We denote a particular realization of private signal si by si and a realization of neigh-
borhood B(i) by B(i) for all i. Given the equilibrium σ and the realization s1, ..., sK−1
and B(1), ...,B(K − 1), all decisions x1, . . . , xK−1 are recursively defined [i.e., they are
non-stochastic; see the definition of the information set in Eq. (2.1)]. Therefore, for any
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B(n) that satisfies maxb∈B(n) b < K, the decision xn is also defined. By the definition
of zn [cf. Eq. (3.3)], this implies that
Pσ(xn = θ | si = si, B(i) = B(i), for i = 1, . . . , K − 1, n)
≤ Pσ(zn = θ | si = si, B(i) = B(i), for i = 1, . . . , K − 1, n).
By integrating over all possible s1, ..., sK−1, sn,B(1), ...,B(K − 1), this yields
Pσ(xn = θ | B(n) = B(n)) ≤ Pσ(zn = θ | B(n) = B(n)),
for any B(n) that satisfies maxb∈B(n) b < K. By integrating over all B(n) that satisfy
this condition, we obtain
Pσ
(
xn = θ
∣∣∣ max
b∈B(n)
b < K
)
≤ Pσ
(
zn = θ
∣∣∣ max
b∈B(n)
b < K
)
. (3.4)
Moreover, since the sequence of neighborhoods {B(i)}i∈N is independent of θ and the
sequence of private signals {si}i∈N, it follows from Eq. (3.3) that the decision zn is given
by
zn = argmax
y∈{0,1}
Pσ(y = θ | s1, ..., sK−1, sn). (3.5)
Therefore, zn is also independent of the sequence of neighborhoods {B(i)}i∈N and we
have
Pσ
(
zn = θ
∣∣∣ max
b∈B(n)
b < K
)
= Pσ (zn = θ) .
Since the private signals have the same distribution, it follows from Eq. (3.5) that for
any n,m ≥ K, the random variables zn and zm have identical probability distributions.
Hence, for any n ≥ K, Eq. (3.5) implies that
Pσ (zn = θ) = Pσ (zK = θ) .
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Combining the preceding two relations with Eq. (3.4), we have for any n ≥ K,
Pσ
(
xn = θ
∣∣∣ max
b∈B(n)
b < K
)
≤ Pσ
(
zn = θ
∣∣∣ max
b∈B(n)
b < K
)
= Pσ (zn = θ) = Pσ (zK = θ) .
Substituting this relation in Eq. (3.2), we obtain for any n ∈ N , n ≥ K,
Pσ(xn = θ) ≤ 1− + Pσ (zK = θ) .
Therefore,
lim inf
n→∞
Pσ(xn = θ) ≤ 1− + Pσ(zK = θ). (3.6)
We finally show that in view of the assumption that F0 and F1 are absolutely contin-
uous with respect to each other [which implies Pσ(x1 = θ) < 1], we have Pσ(zK = θ) < 1
for any given K. If Pσ(x1 = θ) < 1 holds, then we have either Pσ(x1 = θ | θ = 1) < 1 or
Pσ(x1 = θ | θ = 0) < 1. Assume without loss of generality that we have
Pσ(x1 = θ | θ = 1) < 1. (3.7)
Let S denote the set of all private signals such that if s1 ∈ Sσ, then x1 = 0 in equilibrium
σ. Since the first agent’s decision is a function of s1, then Eq. (3.7) is equivalent to
Pσ(s1 ∈ Sσ | θ = 1) > 0.
Since the private signals are conditionally independent given θ, this implies that
Pσ(si ∈ Sσ for all i ≤ K | θ = 1) = Pσ(s1 ∈ Sσ | θ = 1)K > 0. (3.8)
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We next show that if si ∈ Sσ for all i ≤ K, then zK = 0. Using Bayes’ Rule, we have
Pσ(θ = 0 | si ∈ Sσ for all i ≤ K) =
[
1 +
Pσ(si ∈ Sσ for all i ≤ K | θ = 1)
Pσ(si ∈ Sσ for all i ≤ K | θ = 0)
]−1
=
[
1 +
∏K
i=1 Pσ(si ∈ Sσ | θ = 1)∏K
i=1 Pσ(si ∈ Sσ | θ = 0)
]−1
=
[
1 +
(
Pσ(s1 ∈ Sσ | θ = 1)
Pσ(s1 ∈ Sσ | θ = 0)
)K]−1
, (3.9)
where the second equality follows from the conditional independence of the private sig-
nals and the third equality holds since private signals are identically distributed. Ap-
plying Bayes’ Rule on the second term in parentheses in Eq. (3.9), this implies that
Pσ(θ = 0 | si ∈ Sσ for all i ≤ K) =
[
1 +
(
1
Pσ(θ = 0 | s1 ∈ Sσ)
− 1
)K]−1
.(3.10)
Since s1 ∈ Sσ induces x1 = 0, we have Pσ(θ = 0 | s1 ∈ Sσ) ≥ 1/2. Because the function
on the right-handside of Eq. (3.10) is nondecreasing in Pσ(θ = 0 | s1 ∈ Sσ) for any value
in [1/2,1], we obtain
Pσ(θ = 0 | si ∈ Sσ for all i ≤ K) ≥ 1
2
.
By the definition of zK , this implies that if si ∈ Sσ for all i ≤ K, then zK = 0
(we can let zn be equal to 0 whenever both states are equally likely given the private
signals). Combined with the fact that the event {si ∈ Sσ for all i ≤ K} has positive
conditional probability given θ = 1 under measure Pσ [cf. Eq. (3.8)], this implies that
Pσ(zK = θ) < 1. Substituting this relation in Eq. (3.6), we have
lim inf
n→∞
Pσ(xn = θ) < 1,
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thus showing that asymptotic learning does not occur.
This theorem states the intuitive result that with nonexpanding observations, asymp-
totic learning will fail. This result is not surprising, since asymptotic learning requires
the aggregation of the information of different individuals. But a network topology with
nonexpanding observations does not allow such aggregation. Intuitively, nonexpanding
observations, or equivalently the existence of an excessively influential group of agents,
imply that infinitely many individuals will observe finitely many actions with positive
probability and this will not enable them to aggregate the dispersed information collec-
tively held by the entire social network.
3.2 Expanding Observations as a Sufficient Condi-
tion for Learning
The main question is then whether, once we exclude network topologies with nonex-
panding observations, what other conditions need to be imposed to ensure asymptotic
learning. The following theorem shows that for general network topologies, unbounded
private beliefs and expanding observations are sufficient to guarantee asymptotic learn-
ing in all equilibria.
Theorem 2 Assume that the signal structure (F0,F1) has unbounded private beliefs and
the network topology {Qn}n∈N has expanding observations. Then, asymptotic learning
occurs in every equilibrium σ ∈ Σ∗.
The proof of this theorem is provided in Section 3.3. However, many of its implica-
tions can be discussed before presenting a detailed proof.
Theorem 2 implies that unbounded private beliefs are sufficient for asymptotic learn-
ing for most (but not all) network topologies. In particular, the condition that the
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network topology has expanding observations is fairly mild and only requires a mini-
mum amount of arrival of recent information to the network. Social networks in which
each individual observes all past actions, those in which each observes just his neighbor,
and those in which each individual observes M ≥ 1 agents independently and uniformly
drawn from his predecessors are all examples of network topologies with expanding ob-
servations. Theorem 2 therefore implies that unbounded private beliefs are sufficient to
guarantee asymptotic learning in social networks with these properties and many others.
Nevertheless, there are interesting network topologies where asymptotic learning does
not occur even with unbounded private signals. The following corollary to Theorems
1 and 2 shows that for an interesting class of stochastic network topologies, there is a
critical topology at which there is a phase transition—that is, for all network topologies
with greater expansion of observations than this critical topology, there will be asymp-
totic learning and for all topologies with less expansion, asymptotic learning will fail.
The proof of this corollary is also provided in Section 3.3.
Corollary 1 Assume that the signal structure (F0,F1) has unbounded private beliefs.
Assume also that the network topology is given by {Qn}n∈N such that
Qn(m ∈ B(n)) = A
(n− 1)C for all n and all m < n,
where, given n, the draws for m,m′ < n are independent and A and C are positive
constants. If C < 1 then asymptotic learning occurs in all equilibria. If C ≥ 1, then
asymptotic learning does not occur in any equilibrium.
Given the class of network topologies in this corollary, C < 1 implies that as the
network becomes large, there will be sufficient expansion of observations. In contrast,
for C ≥ 1, stochastic process Qn does not place enough probability on observing recent
actions and the network topology is nonexpanding. Consequently, Theorem 1 applies
and there is no asymptotic learning.
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To highlight the implications of Theorems 1 and 2 for deterministic network topolo-
gies, let us introduce the following definition.
Definition 7 Assume that the network topology is deterministic. Then, we say a finite
sequence of agents pi is an information path of agent n if for each i, pii ∈ B(pii+1) and
the last element of pi is n. Let pi(n) be an information path of agent n that has maximal
length. Then, we let L(n) denote the number of elements in pi(n) and call it agent n’s
information depth.
Intuitively, the concepts of information path and information depth capture the
intuitive notion of how long the “trail” of the information in the neighborhood of an
individual is. For example, if each individual observes only his immediate neighbor
(i.e., B(n) = {n − 1} with probability one), each will have a small neighborhood, but
the information depth of a high-indexed individual will be high (or the “trail” will be
long), because the immediate neighbor’s action will contain information about the signals
of all previous individuals. The next corollary shows that with deterministic network
topologies, asymptotic learning will occur if only if the information depth (or the trail
of the information) increases without bound as the network becomes larger.
Corollary 2 Assume that the signal structure (F0,F1) has unbounded private beliefs.
Assume that the network topology is deterministic. Then, asymptotic learning occurs
for all equilibria if the sequence of information depths {L(n)}n∈N goes to infinity. If the
sequence {L(n)}n∈N does not go to infinity, then asymptotic learning does not occur in
any equilibrium.
The notion of information depth extends to stochastic network topologies. In fact,
expanding observations is equivalent to L(n) going to infinity in probability. That is,
expanding observations occurs if, and only if, for every  > 0 and every K ∈ N, there
exists some N ∈ N such that for all n ≥ N , Q (L(n) < K) ≤ .
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3.3 Learning under Unbounded Private Beliefs
This section presents a proof of our main result, Theorem 2. The proof follows by com-
bining several lemmas and propositions provided in this section. In the next subsection,
we show that the expected utility of an individual is no less than the expected utility of
any agent in his realized neighborhood. Though useful, this is a relatively weak result
and is not sufficient to establish that asymptotic learning will take place in equilibrium.
Subsection 3.3.2 provides the key result for the proof of Theorem 2. It focuses on the
case in which each individual observes the action of a single agent and private beliefs
are unbounded. Under these conditions, it establishes (a special case of) the strong im-
provement principle, which shows that the increase in expected utility is bounded away
from zero (as long as social beliefs have not converged to the true state). Subsection
3.3.3 generalizes the strong improvement principle to the case in which each individual
has a stochastically-generated neighborhood, potentially consisting of multiple (or no)
agents. Subsection 3.3.4 then presents the proof of Theorem 2, which follows by combin-
ing these results with the fact that the network topology has expanding observations, so
that the sequence of improvements will ultimately lead to asymptotic learning. Finally,
subsection 3.3.5 provides proofs of Corollaries 1 and 2, which were presented in Section
3.2.
3.3.1 Information Monotonicity
As a first step, we show that the ex ante probability of an agent making the correct
decision (and thus his expected payoff) is no less than the probability of any of the
agents in his realized neighborhood making the correct decision.
Proposition 2 (Information Monotonicity) Let σ ∈ Σ∗ be an equilibrium. For any
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agent n and neighborhood B, we have
Pσ(xn = θ | B(n) = B) ≥ max
b∈B
Pσ(xb = θ).
Proof. Let h : {(n,B(n)) : n ∈ N,B(n) ⊆ {1, 2, ..., n−1}} → N be an arbitrary function
that maps an agent and a neighborhood of the agent into an element of the neighborhood,
i.e., h(n,B(n)) ∈ B(n). In view of the characterization of the equilibrium decision xn [cf.
Eq. (2.2)], it follows that for any private signal sn, neighborhood B(n) ⊆ {1, 2, ..., n−1},
and decisions xk, k ∈ B(n), we have
Pσ(xn = θ | sn, B(n), xk, k ∈ B(n)) ≥ Pσ(xh(n,B(n)) = θ | sn, B(n), xk, k ∈ B(n)).
By integrating over all possible private signals and decisions of agents in the neighbor-
hood, we obtain that for any n and any B(n) = B,
Pσ(xn = θ | B(n) = B) ≥ Pσ(xh(n,B(n)) = θ | B(n) = B) = Pσ(xh(n,B) = θ),
where the equality follows by the assumption that each neighborhood is generated inde-
pendently from all other neighborhoods. By taking the maximum over all functions h,
we obtain
Pσ(xn = θ | B(n) = B) ≥ max
b∈B
Pσ(xb = θ),
showing the desired relation.
Information monotonicity is similar to the (expected) welfare improvement principle
in Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) and in Smith and Sorensen (1998), and the imitation
principle in Gale and Kariv (2003) and is very intuitive. However, it is not sufficiently
strong to establish asymptotic learning. To ensure that, as the network becomes large,
decisions converge (in probability) to the correct action, we need strict improvements.
This will be established in the next two subsections.
51
3.3.2 Observing a Single Agent
In this subsection, we focus on a specific network topology where each agent observes
the decision of a single agent. For this case, we provide an explicit characterization
of the equilibrium, and under the assumption that private beliefs are unbounded, we
establish a preliminary version of the strong improvement principle, which provides a
lower bound on the increase in the ex ante probability that an individual will make a
correct decision over his neighbor’s probability (recall that for now there is a single agent
in each individual’s neighborhood, thus each individual has a single “neighbor”). This
result will be generalized to arbitrary networks in the next subsection.
For each n and strategy profile σ, let us define Y σn and N
σ
n as the probabilities of
agent n making the correct decision conditional on state θ. More formally, these are
defined as
Y σn = Pσ(xn = 1 | θ = 1), Nσn = Pσ(xn = 0 | θ = 0). (3.11)
The unconditional probability of a correct decision is then
1
2
(Y σn +N
σ
n ) = Pσ(xn = θ). (3.12)
We also define the thresholds Lσn and U
σ
n in terms of these probabilities:
Lσn =
1−Nσn
1−Nσn + Y σn
, Uσn =
Nσn
Nσn + 1− Y σn
. (3.13)
The next proposition shows that the equilibrium decisions are fully characterized in
terms of these thresholds.
Proposition 3 Let B(n) = {b} for some agent n. Let σ ∈ Σ∗ be an equilibrium, and let
52
Figure 3-1: The equilibrium decision rule when observing a single agent, illustrated on
the private belief space.
Lσb and U
σ
b be given by Eq. (3.13). Then, agent n’s decision xn in equilibrium σ satisfies
xn =

0, if pn < L
σ
b
xb, if pn ∈ (Lσb , Uσb )
1, if pn > U
σ
b .
The proof is omitted since it is an immediate application of Lemma 1 [use Bayes’
Rule to determine Pσ(θ = 1|xb = j) for each j ∈ {0, 1}].
Note that the sequence {(Un, Ln)} only depends on {(Yn, Nn)}, and is thus determin-
istic. This reflects the fact that each individual recognizes the amount of information
that will be contained in the action of the previous agent, which determines his own
decision thresholds. Individual actions are still stochastic since they are determined by
whether the individual’s private belief is below Lb, above Ub, or in between (see Figure
3-1).
Using the structure of the equilibrium decision rule, the next lemma provides an
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expression for the probability of agent n making the correct decision conditional on his
observing agent b < n, in terms of the private belief distributions and the thresholds Lσb
and Uσb .
Lemma 4 Let B(n) = {b} for some agent n. Let σ ∈ Σ∗ be an equilibrium, and let Lσb
and Uσb be given by Eq. (3.13). Then,
Pσ(xn = θ | B(n) = {b})
=
1
2
[
G0(Lσb ) +
(
G0(Uσb )−G0(Lσb )
)
Nσb + (1−G1(Uσb )) +
(
G1(Uσb )−G1(Lσb )
)
Y σb
]
.
Proof. By definition, agent n receives the same expected utility from all his possible
equilibrium choices. We can thus compute the expected utility by supposing that the
agent will choose xn = 0 when indifferent. Then, the expected utility of agent n (the
probability of the correct decision) can be written as
Pσ(xn = θ | B(n) = {b})
= Pσ(pn ≤ Lσb | θ = 0)P(θ = 0) + Pσ(pn ∈ (Lσb , Uσb ], xb = 0 | θ = 0)P(θ = 0)
+Pσ(pn > Uσb | θ = 1)P(θ = 1) + Pσ(pn ∈ (Lσb , Uσb ], xb = 1 | θ = 1)P(θ = 1).
The result then follows using the fact that pn and xb are conditionally independent given
θ and the notation for the private belief distributions [cf. Eq. (2.8)].
Using the previous lemma, we next strengthen Proposition 2 and provide a lower
bound on the amount of improvement in the ex ante probability of making the correct
decision between an agent and his neighbor.
Lemma 5 Let B(n) = {b} for some agent n. Let σ ∈ Σ∗ be an equilibrium, and let Lσb
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and Uσb be given by Eq. (3.13). Then,
Pσ(xn = θ | B(n) = {b}) ≥ Pσ(xb = θ) + (1−N
σ
b )L
σ
b
8
G1
(
Lσb
2
)
+
(1− Y σb )(1− Uσb )
8
[
1−G0
(
1 + Uσb
2
)]
.
Proof. In Lemma 3(b), let r = Lσb , z = L
σ
b /2, so that we obtain
(1−Nσb )G0(Lσb ) ≥ Y σb G1(Lσb ) +
(1−Nσb )Lσb
4
G1
(
Lσb
2
)
.
Next, again using Lemma 3(b) and letting r = Uσb and w = (1 + U
σ
b )/2, we have
(1− Y σb )[1−G1(Uσb )] ≥ Nσb [1−G0(σb )] +
(1− Y σb )(1− Uσb )
4
[
1−G0
(
1 + Uσb
2
)]
.
Combining the preceding two relations with Lemma 4 and using the fact that Y σb +N
σ
b =
2Pσ(xb = θ) [cf. Eq. (3.12)], the desired result follows.
The next lemma establishes that the lower bound on the amount of improvement
in the ex ante probability is uniformly bounded away from zero for unbounded private
beliefs and when Pσ(xb = θ) < 1, i.e., when asymptotic learning is not achieved.
Lemma 6 Let B(n) = {b} for some n. Let σ ∈ Σ∗ be an equilibrium, and denote
α = Pσ(xb = θ). Then,
Pσ(xn = θ | B(n) = {b}) ≥ α + (1− α)
2
8
min
{
G1
(
1− α
2
)
, 1−G0
(
1 + α
2
)}
.
Proof. We consider two cases separately.
Case 1: Nσb ≤ α. From the definition of Lσb and the fact that Y σb = 2α − Nσb [cf. Eq.
55
(3.12)], we have
Lσb =
1−Nσb
1− 2Nσb + 2α
.
Since σ is an equilibrium, we have α ≥ 1/2, and thus the right hand-side of the preceding
inequality is a nonincreasing function of Nσb . Since N
σ
b ≤ α, this relation therefore
implies that Lσb ≥ 1− α. Combining the relations 1−Nσb ≥ 1− α and Lσb ≥ 1− α, we
obtain
(1−Nσb )Lσb
8
G1
(
Lσb
2
)
≥ (1− α)
2
8
G1
(
1− α
2
)
. (3.14)
Case 2: Nσb ≥ α. Since Y σb + Nσb = 2α, this implies that Y σb ≤ α. Using the definition
of Uσb and a similar argument as the one above, we obtain
(1− Y σb )(1− Uσb )
8
[
1−G0
(
1 + Uσb
2
)]
≥ (1− α)
2
8
[
1−G0
(
1 + α
2
)]
. (3.15)
Combining Eqs. (3.14) and (3.15), we obtain
(1−Nσb )Lσb
8
G1
(
Lσb
2
)
+
(1− Y σb )(1− Uσb )
8
[
1−G0
(
1 + Uσb
2
)]
≥ (1− α)
2
8
min
{
G1
(
1− α
2
)
, 1−G0
(
1 + α
2
)}
,
where we also used the fact that each term on the left hand-side of the preceding in-
equality is nonnegative. Substituting this into Lemma 5, the desired result follows.
The preceding lemma characterizes the improvements in the probability of making
the correct decision between an agent and his neighbor. To study the limiting behavior
of these improvements, we introduce the function Z : [1/2, 1]→ [1/2, 1] defined by
Z(α) = α + (1− α)
2
8
min
{
G1
(
1− α
2
)
, 1−G0
(
1 + α
2
)}
. (3.16)
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Lemma 6 establishes that for n, which has B(n) = {b}, we have
Pσ(xn = θ|B(n) = {b}) ≥ Z (Pσ(xb = θ)) , (3.17)
i.e., the function Z acts as an improvement function for the evolution of the probability
of making the correct decision. The function Z(·) has several important properties,
which are formally stated in the next lemma.
Lemma 7 The function Z : [1/2, 1] → [1/2, 1] given in (3.16) satisfy the following
properties:
(a) The function Z has no upwards jumps. That is, for any α ∈ [1/2, 1],
Z(α) = lim
r↑α
Z(r) ≥ lim
r↓α
Z(r).
(b) For any α ∈ [1/2, 1], Z(α) ≥ α.
(c) If the private beliefs are unbounded, then for any α ∈ [1/2, 1), Z(α) > α.
Proof. Since G0 and G1 are cumulative distribution functions, they cannot have down-
wards jumps, i.e., for each j ∈ {0, 1}, limr↑αGj(r) ≤ limr↓αGj(r) for any α ∈ [1/2, 1],
establishing Part (a). Part (b) follows from the fact that cumulative distribution func-
tions take values in [0, 1]. For Part (c), suppose that for some α ∈ [1/2, 1), Z(α) = α.
This implies that
min
{
G1
(
1− α
2
)
, 1−G0
(
1 + α
2
)}
= 0. (3.18)
However, from the assumption on the private beliefs, we have that for all α ∈ (0, 1) and
any j ∈ {0, 1}, Gj(α) ∈ (0, 1), contradicting Eq. (3.18).
The properties of the Z function will be used in the analysis of asymptotic learning
in general networks in subsection 3.3.3. The analysis of asymptotic learning requires
the relevant improvement function to be both continuous and monotone. However,
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Z does not necessarily satisfy these properties. We next construct a related function
Z : [1/2, 1]→ [1/2, 1] that satisfies these properties and can be used as the improvement
function in the asymptotic analysis. Let Z be defined as:
Z(α) = 1
2
(
α + sup
r∈[1/2,α]
Z(r)
)
. (3.19)
This function shares the same “improvement” properties as Z, but is also nondecreasing
and continuous. The properties of the function Z(·) stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 8 The function Z : [1/2, 1] → [1/2, 1] given in (3.19) satisfy the following
properties:
(a) For any α ∈ [1/2, 1], Z(α) ≥ α.
(b) If the private beliefs are unbounded, then for any α ∈ [1/2, 1), Z(α) > α.
(c) The function Z is increasing and continuous.
Proof. Parts (a) and (b) follow immediately from Lemma 7, parts (b) and (c) respec-
tively. The function supr∈[1/2,α]Z(r) is nondecreasing and the function α is increasing,
therefore the average of these two functions, which is Z, is an increasing function, es-
tablishing the first part of part (c).
We finally show that Z is a continuous function. We first show Z(α) is continuous
for all α ∈ [1/2, 1). To obtain a contradiction, assume that Z is discontinuous at
some α∗ ∈ [1/2, 1). This implies that supr∈[1/2,α]Z(r) is discontinuous at α∗. Since
supr∈[1/2,α]Z(r) is a nondecreasing function, we have
lim
α↓α∗
sup
r∈[1/2,α]
Z(r) > sup
r∈[1/2,α∗]
Z(r),
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from which it follows that there exists some  > 0 such that for any δ > 0
sup
r∈[1/2,α∗+δ]
Z(r) > Z(α) +  for all α ∈ [1/2, α∗).
This contradicts the fact that the function Z does not have an upward jump [cf. Lemma
7 (a)], and establishes the continuity of Z(α) for all α ∈ [1/2, 1). The continuity of the
function Z(α) at α = 1 follows from part (a).
The next proposition shows that the function Z is also a (strong) improvement
function for the evolution of the probability of making the correct decision.
Proposition 4 (Strong Improvement Principle) Let B(n) = {b} for some n. Let σ ∈ Σ∗
be an equilibrium. Then, we have
Pσ(xn = θ | B(n) = {b}) ≥ Z (Pσ(xb = θ)) . (3.20)
Proof. Let α denote Pσ(xb = θ). If Z (α) = α, then the result follows immediately from
Proposition 2. Suppose next that Z (α) > α. This implies that Z(α) < supr∈[1/2,α]Z(r).
Therefore, there exists some α ∈ [1/2, α] such that
Z(α) > Z(α). (3.21)
We next show that Pσ(xn = θ|B(n) = b) ≥ Z(α). Agent n can always (privately)
make the information from his observation of xb coarser (i.e., not observe xb according
to some probability). Let the observation thus generated by agent n be denoted by x˜b,
and suppose that it is given by
x˜b =

xb, with probability (2α− 1)/(2α− 1)
0, with probability (α− α)/(2α− 1)
1, with probability (α− α)/(2α− 1),
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where the realizations of x˜b are independent from agent n’s information set. Next observe
that Pσ(x˜b = θ) = α. Then, Lemma 6 implies that Pσ(xn = θ|B(n) = b) ≥ Z(α). Since
Z(α) > Z(α) [cf. Eq. (3.21)], the desired result follows.
3.3.3 Learning from Multiple Agents
In this subsection, we generalize the results of the previous subsection to an arbitrary
network topology. We first present a stronger version of the information monotonicity
relation (cf. Proposition 2), where the amount of improvement is given by the improve-
ment function Z defined in Eq. (3.20). Even though a full characterization of equilibrium
decisions in general network topologies is a nontractable problem (recall the discussion
in subsection 2.2.3), it is possible to establish an analogue of Proposition 4, that is, a
generalized strong improvement principle, which provides a lower bound on the amount
of increase in the probabilities of making the correct decision. The idea of the proof
is to show that improvements can be no less than the case in which each individual’s
neighborhood consisted of a single agent.
Proposition 5 (Generalized Strong Improvement Principle) For any n ∈ N, any set
B ⊆ {1, ..., n− 1} and any equilibrium σ ∈ Σ∗, we have
Pσ (xn = θ | B(n) = B) ≥ Z
(
max
b∈B
Pσ(xb = θ)
)
.
Proof. Given an equilibrium σ ∈ Σ∗ and agent n , let hσ be a function that maps
any subset of {1, . . . , n − 1} to an element of {1, . . . , n − 1} such that for any B ⊂
{1, . . . , n− 1}, we have
hσ(B) ∈ argmax
b∈B
Pσ(xb = θ). (3.22)
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We define wn as the decision that maximizes the conditional probability of making the
correct decision given the private signal sn and the decision of the agent hσ(B(n)), i.e.,
wn ∈ argmax
y∈{0,1}
Pσ
(
y = θ
∣∣ sn, xhσ(B(n))) .
The equilibrium decision xn of agent n satisfies
Pσ(xn = θ | sn, B(n), xk, k ∈ B(n)) ≥ Pσ(wn = θ | sn, B(n), xk, k ∈ B(n)),
[cf. the characterization of the equilibrium decision rule in Eq. (2.2)]. Integrating over all
possible private signals and decisions of neighbors, we obtain for any B ⊂ {1, . . . , n−1},
Pσ (xn = θ | B(n) = B) ≥ Pσ (wn = θ | B(n) = B) . (3.23)
Because wn is an optimal choice given a single observation, Eq. (3.20) holds and yields
Pσ(wn = θ | B(n) = B) ≥ Z
(
Pσ(xhσ(B) = θ)
)
. (3.24)
Combining Eqs. (3.22), (3.23) and (3.24) we obtain the desired result.
This proposition is a key result, since it shows that, under unbounded private beliefs,
there are improvements in payoffs (probabilities of making correct decisions) that are
bounded away from zero. We will next use this generalized strong improvement principle
to prove Theorem 2. The proof involves showing that under the expanding observations
and the unbounded private beliefs assumptions, the amount of improvement in the
probabilities of making the correct decision given by Z accumulates until asymptotic
learning is reached.
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3.3.4 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof consists of two parts. In the first part of the proof, we construct two sequences
{αk} and {φk} such that for all k ≥ 0, there holds
Pσ(xn = θ) ≥ φk for all n ≥ αk. (3.25)
The second part of the proof shows that φk converges to 1, thus establishing the result.
Given some integer K > 0 and scalar  > 0, let N(K, ) > 0 be an integer such that
for all n ≥ N(K, ),
Qn
(
max
b∈B(n)
b < K
)
< ,
(such an integer exists in view of the fact that, by hypothesis, the network topology
features expanding observations). We let α1 = 1 and φ1 = 1/2 and define the sequences
{αk} and φk recursively by
αk+1 = N
(
αk,
1
2
[
1− φkZ(φk)
])
, φk+1 =
φk + Z(φk)
2
.
Using the fact that the range of the function Z is [1/2, 1], it can be seen that φk ∈ [1/2, 1]
for all k, therefore the preceding sequences are well-defined.
We use induction on the index k to prove relation (3.25). Since σ is an equilibrium,
we have
Pσ(xn = θ) ≥ 1
2
for all n ≥ 1,
which together with α1 = 1 and φ1 = 1/2 shows relation (3.25) for k = 1. Assume that
the relation (3.25) holds for an arbitrary k, i.e.,
Pσ(xj = θ) ≥ φk for all j ≥ αk. (3.26)
Consider some agent n with n ≥ αk+1. By integrating the relation from Lemma 5 over
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all possible neighborhoods B(n), we obtain
Pσ (xn = θ) ≥ EB(n)
[
Z
(
max
b∈B(n)
Pσ(xb = θ)
)]
,
where EB(n) denotes the expectation with respect to the neighborhood B(n) (i.e., the
weighted sum over all possible neighborhoods B(n)). We can rewrite the preceding as
Pσ(xn = θ) ≥ EB(n)
[
Z
(
max
b∈B(n)
Pσ (xb = θ)
) ∣∣∣ max
b∈B(n)
b ≥ αk
]
Qn
(
max
b∈B(n)
b ≥ αk
)
+ EB(n)
[
Z
(
max
b∈B(n)
Pσ (xb = θ)
) ∣∣∣ max
b∈B(n)
b < αk
]
Qn
(
max
b∈B(n)
b < αk
)
.
Since the terms on the right hand-side of the preceding relation are nonnegative, this
implies that
Pσ(xn = θ) ≥ EB(n)
[
Z
(
max
b∈B(n)
Pσ (xb = θ)
) ∣∣∣ max
b∈B(n)
b ≥ αk
]
Qn
(
max
b∈B(n)
b ≥ αk
)
.
Since maxb∈B(n) b ≥ αk, Eq. (3.26) implies that
max
b∈B(n)
Pσ(xb = θ) ≥ φk.
Since the function Z is nondecreasing [cf. Lemma 8(c)], combining the preceding two
relations, we obtain
Pσ(xn = θ) ≥ EB(n)
[
Z (φk)
∣∣∣ max
b∈B(n)
b ≥ αk
]
Qn
(
max
b∈B(n)
b ≥ αk
)
= Z(φk)Qn
(
max
b∈B(n)
b ≥ αk
)
,
where the equality follows since the sequence {φk} is deterministic. Using the definition
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of αk, this implies that
Pσ(xn = θ) ≥ Z (φk) 1
2
[
1 +
φk
Z(φk)
]
= φk+1,
thus completing the induction.
We finally prove that φk → 1 as k → ∞. Since Z(α) ≥ α for all α ∈ [1/2, 1]
[cf. Lemma 8(a)], it follows from the definition of φk that {φk}k∈N is a nondecreasing
sequence. It is also bounded and therefore it converges to some φ∗. Taking the limit in
the definition of φk, we obtain
2φ∗ = 2 lim
k→∞
φk = lim
k→∞
[
φk + Z(φk)
]
= φ∗ + Z(φ∗),
where the third equality follows since Z is a continuous function [cf. Lemma 8(c)]. This
shows that φ∗ = Z(φ∗), i.e., φ∗ is a fixed point of Z. Since the private beliefs are
unbounded, the unique fixed point of Z is 1, showing that φk → 1 as k → ∞ and
completing the proof. 
3.3.5 Proofs of Corollaries 1 and 2
Proof of Corollary 1. We first show that if C ≥ 1, then the network topology has
nonexpanding observations. To show this, we set K = 1 in Definition 6 and show
that the probability of infinitely many agents having empty neighborhoods is uniformly
bounded away from 0. We first consider the case C > 1. Then, the probability that the
neighborhood of agent n+ 1 is the empty set is given by
Qn+1(B(n+ 1) = ∅) =
(
1− A
nC
)n
,
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which converges to 1 as n goes to infinity. If C = 1, then
lim
n→∞
Qn+1(B(n+ 1) = ∅) = lim
n→∞
(
1− A
n
)n
= e−A.
Therefore, for infinitely many agents, Qn+1(B(n+1) = ∅) ≥ e−A/2. The preceding show
that the network topology has nonexpanding observations for C ≥ 1, hence the result
follows from Theorem 1.
We next assume that C < 1. For any K and all n ≥ K, we have
Qn+1
(
max
b∈B(n+1)
b ≤ K
)
=
(
1− A
nC
)n−K
,
which converges to 0 as n goes to infinity. Hence the network topology is expanding in
observations and the result follows from Theorem 2. 
Proof of Corollary 2. We show that {L(n)}n∈N goes to infinity if and only if the de-
terministic sequence {maxb∈B(n) b}n∈N goes to infinity. Suppose first {L(n)}n∈N diverges
to infinity. Then, for every K there exists N such that for all n ≥ N , L(n) ≥ K. Note
that
L(n) ≤ 1 + max
b∈B(n)
b
because the longest information path must be a subset of the sequence
(1, 2, ..., max
b∈B(n)
b, n).
So, for n ≥ N , if L(n) ≥ K, then maxb∈B(n) b > K, thus proving the first part of the
lemma. Suppose next that {maxb∈B(n) b}n∈N goes to infinity as n goes to infinity. We
show by induction that for each d ∈ N, there exists some integer Cd such that L(n) ≥ d
for all n ≥ Cd. Since L(n) ≥ 1 for all n, then C1 = 1. Assume such Cd exists for some
d. Then, we show that such a Cd+1 also exists. Since {maxb∈B(n) b}n∈N goes to infinity,
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there exists some Nd such that for all n ≥ Nd,
max
b∈B(n)
b ≥ Cd.
Now, for any n ≥ Nd, there exists a path with size d up to some k ≥ Cd and then
another observation from k to n, therefore L(n) ≥ d+ 1. Hence, Cd+1 = Nd. 
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Chapter 4
The Rate of Learning
4.1 Decay of the Error Probabilities
The key metric of this thesis, asymptotic learning, measures how informed the action of
agent n of the social network is in the limit as n goes to infinity. This metric determines
whether agents learn from the actions of peers in very large societies. However, in any
application of this model, a social network would be described by a finite graph. To
understand how well asymptotic learning serves as a good approximation for finite-sized
networks, we need to analyze the speed of learning. The rate at which learning happens
is therefore of considerable interest since convergence to approximately correct beliefs
and actions might require an arbitrarily large network.
Another important consideration that leads us to study of the rate of learning is the
problem of comparing the impact of different network topologies on the learning process.
In Chapter 3, we determine that a minimal amount of communication (expanding obser-
vations) is sufficient to produce asymptotic learning. Therefore, analyzing the speed of
learning is important for understanding how network topology affects learning in social
networks.
We explore in this chapter the rate of decay of the probability of error under Bayesian
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learning in the case of unbounded private beliefs. We investigate the rate of convergence
of individual beliefs and actions to the correct beliefs and actions in a simplified version
of our general model. In particular, instead of general network topologies, we focus on
situations in which individuals observe only one past action. We distinguish two cases.
In the first, which we refer to as immediate neighbor sampling, each individual observes
the most recent action, i.e., B(n) = {n − 1} for each n ∈ N. In the second, which we
refer to as random sampling, each individual observes any one of the past actions with
equal probability. That is, for each n ∈ N and each b ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}, B(n) = {b} with
probability 1/(n− 1).
We develop a method of estimating an upper bound on the error probability in both
cases, based on approximating this bound with an ordinary differential equation. Our
results are as follows:
• With random sampling, the probability of the incorrect action converges to zero
faster than a logarithmic rate [in the sense that this probability is no greater than
(log(n))−1/(K+1) where n is the number of individuals in the network and K is a
constant].
• With immediate neighbor sampling, the probability of the incorrect action con-
verges to zero faster than a polynomial rate [in the sense that this probability is
no greater than n−1/(K+1)].
• We show by means of an example that the bounds are tight. That is, we construct
a signal structure where the probability of error decays at a logarithmic rate with
random sampling and at a polynomial rate with immediate neighbor sampling.
The immediate neighbor sampling enables faster aggregation of information, because
each individual is sampled only once. In contrast, with random sampling, each individual
is sampled infinitely often. Thus, with a random sampling, there is slower rate of arrival
of new information into the system. While real-world social networks are much more
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complex than the two stylized topologies we study, our results already suggest some
general insights. In particular, they suggest that social networks in which the same
individuals are the (main or only) source of the information of many others will lead to
slower learning than networks in which the opinions and information of new members
are incorporated into the “social belief” more rapidly.
The most closely related paper is Tay, Tsitsiklis and Win (2007), who study the
problem of information aggregation over sensor networks. They consider decision rules
that minimize the error probability of the final agent of a finite sequence (different
model from the perfect Bayesian equilibrium characterized here) and provide lower and
upper bounds on the rate of convergence of posteriors generated by decentralized agents.
The formal model is similar to our model of social learning with immediate neighbor
sampling, though our bounds on the rate of convergence are not present in Tay, Tsitsiklis
and Win. Their lower bounds apply to our model of immediate neighbor sampling. In
addition, to the best of our knowledge, our results on the speed of learning in the random
sampling case are also not present in the previous literature.
4.2 Upper Bounds on the Error Probability
In this section, we prove the upper bounds on the error probability in social networks.
We first introduce an important property of the private belief distributions that will
impact the rate of convergence results.
Definition 8 The private belief distributions have polynomial shape if there exist
some constant C ′ > 0 and K > 0 such that
G1 (α) ≥ C ′αK and G0 (1− α) ≤ 1− C ′αK (4.1)
for all α ∈ [0, 1/2]. If Eq. (4.1) holds only for α ∈ [0, ] for some  > 0, then the private
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belief distributions have polynomial tails.
This condition guarantees that strong signals in favor of both states of the world
occur fairly frequently. It eliminates, for example, unbounded private beliefs generated
by two Gaussian distributions F0 and F1 with different mean values. In such cases, there
are very strong signals in favor of both states of the world (hence, unbounded private
beliefs), but they occur very infrequently because normally distributed random variables
rarely deviate several standard deviations away from the mean. If the probability of a
very informative signal is small, then learning will be slower since a large number of
agents will need to arrive before a well-informed agent acts.
For simplicity, the results in this paper assume polynomial shape, but they extend
immediately to private belief distributions with polynomial tails. Note that polynomial
shape implies there exist some constants C > 0 and K > 0 such that
min
{
G1
(
1− α
2
)
, 1−G0
(
1 + α
2
)}
≥ C(1− α)K (4.2)
for all α ∈ [1/2, 1].
We assume in this section that G0 and G1 are continuous distributions in order
to guarantee that there is almost surely unique Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This
assumption could be relaxed at the expense of more notation.
We now restate Lemma 6 from Chapter 3 that establishes a lower bound on the
amount of improvement in the ex ante probability of making the correct decision between
an agent and his neighbor. This bound will be key in the subsequent convergence rate
analysis.
Lemma 6 Let B(n) = {b} for some n and denote α = Pσ(xb = θ). In equilibrium,
Pσ(xn = θ|B(n) = {b}) ≥ α + 1
8
(1− α)2 min
{
G1
(
1− α
2
)
, 1−G0
(
1 + α
2
)}
.
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When the private beliefs have polynomial shape, we obtain from Lemma 6 and Eq.
(4.2) that for some C > 0 and K > 0,
Pσ(xn = θ|B(n) = {b}) ≥ α + C
8
(1− α)K+2, (4.3)
where α = Pσ(xb = θ). Note that the right-hand side of Eq. (4.3) is increasing in α over
[1/2, 1] if
C <
2K+1
K + 2
. (4.4)
Note that if Eq. (4.3) holds for some C > 0, then it also holds for any C ′ ∈ (0, C). So, we
can assume without loss of generality that Eq. (4.4) holds and, therefore, the right-hand
side of Eq. (4.3) is increasing in α.
We now state and prove the bound on the speed of learning for the immediate
neighbor sampling network topology.
Theorem 3 Suppose agents sample immediate neighbors and the private beliefs have
polynomial shape, then
Pσ(xn 6= θ) = O
(
n
−1
K+1
)
.
Proof. To prove this bound, we construct a pair of functions φ and φ˜, where φ can be
represented by a difference equation and φ˜ by a differential equation and show that for
all t ∈ N, Pσ(xt = θ) ≥ φ(t) ≥ φ˜(t).
When the conditions of the proposition hold, we have from Eq. (4.3) that for all
n ∈ N,
Pσ(xn+1 = θ) ≥ Pσ(xn = θ) + C
8
(1− Pσ(xn = θ))K+2 . (4.5)
We construct a sequence {φ(n)}n∈N where φ(1) = Pσ(x1 = θ) and, recursively, for all
n ∈ N,
φ(n+ 1) = φ(n) +
C
8
(1− φ(n))K+2
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and proceed to show by induction that for all n ∈ N ,
Pσ(xn = θ) ≥ φ(n). (4.6)
The relation holds for n = 1 by construction. Suppose the relation holds for some n.
Then,
Pσ(xn+1 = θ) ≥ Pσ(xn = θ) + C
8
(1− Pσ(xn = θ))K+2
≥ φ(n) + C
8
(1− φ(n))K+2
= φ(n+ 1),
where the second inequality holds because we assumed that the right-hand side of Eq.
(4.3) is increasing in α. Therefore, Eq. (4.6) holds for all n.
Let us now define φ(t) on non-integer values of t by linear interpolation of the integer
values. That is, for any t ∈ [1,∞),
φ(t) = φ(btc) + C
8
(t− btc) (1− φ(btc))K+2 .
Finding such a φ is equivalent to solving the following differential equation (where deriva-
tives are defined only at non-integer times):
dφ(t)
dt
=
C
8
(1− φ(btc))K+2 .
Let us now construct yet another continuous time function φ˜(t) to bound φ(t). Let
φ˜(1) = φ(1) and
dφ˜(t)
dt
=
C
8
(
1− φ˜(t)
)K+2
. (4.7)
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Note that both φ and φ˜ are increasing functions. We now show that
φ˜(t) ≤ φ(t) for all t ∈ [1,∞). (4.8)
Let t∗ be some value such that φ˜(t∗) = φ(t∗). Then, for any  ∈ [0, 1− (t∗ − bt∗c)],
φ(t∗ + ) = φ(t∗) + 
C
8
(1− φ(bt∗c))K+2
≥ φ(t∗) + C
8
(1− φ(t∗))K+2
= φ˜(t∗) + 
C
8
(
1− φ˜(t∗)
)K+2
≥ φ˜(t∗) +
∫ t∗+
t∗
C
8
(
1− φ˜(t)
)K+2
dt
= φ˜(t∗ + ),
where the first equality comes from φ’s piecewise linearity, the following inequality from
the monotonicity of φ, the second equality from φ˜(t∗) = φ(t∗) and the second inequality
from the monotonicity of φ˜. Therefore, for any t∗ such that φ˜(t∗) = φ(t∗), we have that
for all  ∈ [0, 1− (t∗ − bt∗c)], φ˜(t∗ + ) ≤ φ(t∗ + ). Hence, φ˜ does not cross above φ at
any point and, since both functions are continuous, it implies Eq. (4.8) holds.
Combining Eqs. (4.6) and (4.8) we obtain that for any n ∈ N,
Pσ(xn = θ) ≥ φ(n) ≥ φ˜(n).
See Figure 4-1 for a graphical representation of this bound. We can solve the ODE of
Eq. (4.7) exactly and calculate φ˜(n) for every n. The solution is as follows: there exists
some other constant C (which is determined by the boundary value Pσ(x1 = θ) = φ˜(1))
such that for each n,
φ˜(n) = 1−
(
1
8(K + 1)C(n+ C)
) 1
K+1
.
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Figure 4-1: Bound used to prove Theorems 3 and 4. The values of Pσ(xn = θ) are
lower bounded by the difference equation φ, which in turn are lower bounded by the
differential equation φ˜.
Therefore,
Pσ(xn 6= θ) ≤
(
1
8(K + 1)C(n+ C)
) 1
K+1
and the desired result follows.
Theorem 4 Suppose that agents use random sampling and the private beliefs have poly-
nomial shape, then
Pσ(xn 6= θ) = O
(
(log n)
−1
K+1
)
.
Proof. To prove this result, we again construct a pair of functions φ and φ˜ and show
that for all t ∈ N, Pσ(xn = θ) ≥ φ(t) ≥ φ˜(t).
Under a random sampling topology, we have for all n ∈ N,
Pσ(xn+1 = θ) =
1
n
n∑
b=1
Pσ(xn+1 = θ|B(n+ 1) = {b})
=
1
n
[Pσ(xn+1 = θ|B(n+ 1) = {n}) + (n− 1)Pσ(xn = θ)] ,
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because conditional on observing the same b < n, agents n and n + 1 have identical
probabilities of making an optimal decision. From Eq. (4.3), we obtain that
Pσ(xn+1 = θ) ≥ Pσ(xn = θ) + C
8n
(1− Pσ(xn = θ))K+2 . (4.9)
Note that the right-hand side of Eq. (4.9) is increasing in Pσ(xn = θ) for any n ≥ 1
because we assumed the right-hand side of Eq. (4.3) is increasing in α.
Let’s recursively construct a sequence φ(n) with φ(1) = Pσ(x1 = θ) and, for all
n ∈ N,
φ(n+ 1) = φ(n) +
C
8n
(1− φ(n))K+2 .
Now, we show by induction that
Pσ(xn = θ) ≥ φ(n). (4.10)
The relation holds for n = 1 by construction. Suppose the relation holds for some n.
Then,
Pσ(xn+1 = θ) ≥ Pσ(xn = θ) + C
8n
(1− Pσ(xn = θ))K+2
≥ φ(n) + C
8n
(1− φ(n))K+2
= φ(n+ 1).
where the second inequality holds because the right-hand side of Eq. (4.9) is increasing
in Pσ(xn = θ). Therefore, Eq. (4.10) holds for all n.
Let us now define φ(t) on non-integer values of t by linear interpolation of the integer
values. That is, for any t ∈ [1,∞),
φ(t) = φ(btc) + C
8btc(t− btc) (1− φ(btc))
K+2 .
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Finding such a φ is equivalent to solving the following differential equation (where deriva-
tives are defined only at non-integer times):
dφ(t)
dt
=
C
8btc (1− φ(btc))
K+2 .
Let us now construct yet another continuous time function φ˜(t) to bound φ(t). Let
φ˜(1) = φ(1) and
dφ˜(t)
dt
=
C
8t
(
1− φ˜(t)
)K+2
. (4.11)
Note that both φ and φ˜ are increasing functions. We now show that
φ˜(t) ≤ φ(t) for all t ∈ [1,∞). (4.12)
Let t∗ be some value such that φ˜(t∗) = φ(t∗). Then, for any  ∈ [0, 1− (t∗ − bt∗c)],
φ(t∗ + ) = φ(t∗) + 
C
8bt∗c (1− φ(bt
∗c))K+2
≥ φ(t∗) +  C
8t∗
(1− φ(t∗))K+2
= φ˜(t∗) + 
C
8t∗
(
1− φ˜(t∗)
)K+2
≥ φ˜(t∗) +
∫ t∗+
t∗
C
8t
(
1− φ˜(t)
)K+2
dt
= φ˜(t∗ + ),
where the first equality comes from φ’s piecewise linearity, the following inequality from
the monotonicity of φ, the second equality from φ˜(t∗) = φ(t∗) and the second inequality
from the monotonicity of φ˜. Therefore, for any t∗ such that φ˜(t∗) = φ(t∗), we have that
for all  ∈ [0, 1− (t∗ − bt∗c)], φ˜(t∗ + ) ≤ φ(t∗ + ). Hence, φ˜ does not cross above φ at
any point and, since both functions are continuous, it implies Eq. (4.12) holds.
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Combining Eqs. (4.10) and (4.12) we obtain that for any n ∈ N,
Pσ(xn = θ) ≥ φ(n) ≥ φ˜(n).
Again, we can solve the ODE of Eq. (4.11) exactly and calculate φ˜(n) for every n.
The solution is that there exists some other constant C (which is determined by the
boundary value Pσ(x1 = θ) = φ˜(1)) such that for each n,
φ˜(n) = 1−
(
1
8(K + 1)C(log n+ C)
) 1
K+1
.
Therefore,
Pσ(xn 6= θ) ≤
(
1
8(K + 1)C(log n+ C)
) 1
K+1
and the desired result follows.
4.3 Tightness of the Bounds
This section presents an example of a signal structure that demonstrates a signal struc-
ture for which learning with immediate neighbor sampling occurs at a polynomial rate
and learning with a random sampling network topology occurs at a logarithmic rate,
thus establishing the tightness of Theorems 3 and 4.
Example 2 For each n, let the signal sn ∈ [0, 1] be generated by the following signal
structure:
F0(sn) = 2sn − s2n and F1(sn) = s2n.
Note that F0 and F1 above are not probability measures, but cumulative distribution
functions. In this example, the signals are identical to the private beliefs, i.e., pn(sn) =
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sn. Therefore, the state-conditional distributions of private signals [cf. Eq. (2.8)] are
G0(r) = 2r − r2 and G1(r) = r2. (4.13)
Therefore, this signal structure has polynomial shape. We now show that under this
particular signal structure, for any n,
Pσ(xn+1 = θ|B(n+ 1) = {n}) = Pσ(xn = θ) + (1− Pσ(xn = θ))2. (4.14)
From Lemma 4, we obtain a recursion on Pσ(xn = θ) that is defined in terms of
Y σn , N
σ
n , U
σ
n and L
σ
n [cf. Eqs. (3.11) and (3.13)]. Since the signal structure is symmetric,
the state-conditional probabilities must be identical, i.e.,
Pσ(xn = θ) = Pσ(xn = θ|θ = 0) = Nσn = Pσ(xn = θ|θ = 1) = Y σn ,
and furthermore, the decision thresholds satisfy
Pσ(xn = θ) = Uσn = 1− Lσn.
To simplify the notation, denote Pσ(xn = θ) = z. The recursion of Lemma 4 can thus
be written as
Pσ(xn+1 = θ|B(n+ 1) = {n}) = 1
2
[G0(1− z)+
(G1(z)−G0(1− z))z + (1−G1(z)) + (G1(z)−G1(1− z))z] ,
which reduces to
Pσ(xn+1 = θ|B(n+ 1) = {n}) = z + (1− z)2,
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once we replace G0 and G1 according to Eq. (4.13), thus proving Eq. (4.14). Using
an ODE bound similar to the proof method of Theorems 3 and 4, we obtain that the
probability Pσ(xn = θ) can be approximated by w(t) in the immediate neighbor sampling
case (B(n) = {n− 1}) and
dw(t)
dt
= (1− w(t))2.
Solving this ODE yields that for some constant C,
w(t) = 1− 1
t+ C
.
Thus, 1− w(t) = Θ (t−1), which implies that
Pσ(xn 6= θ) = Θ
(
n−1
)
.
For the random sampling case, the ODE that bounds the probability of optimal decision
is
dw(t)
dt
=
(1− w(t))2
t
.
Solving this ODE we obtain that for some constant C,
w(t) = 1− 1
log(t) + C
and thus obtain
Pσ(xn 6= θ) = Θ
(
(log n)−1
)
.
Therefore, we conclude that learning is significantly slower with random sampling than
with immediate neighbor sampling, at least for signal structures with polynomial shape.
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Chapter 5
The Case of Bounded Private Beliefs
In this chapter, we show that for several families of network topologies, asymptotic
learning does not occur under bounded private beliefs. We also show that, surprisingly,
learning occurs in a class of stochastically-generated social networks where infinitely
many agents observe the actions of a set of neighbors that is not sufficiently persuasive.
5.1 No Learning under Bounded Private Beliefs
In the full observation network topology, bounded beliefs imply lack of asymptotic learn-
ing. One might thus expect a converse to Theorem 2, whereby asymptotic learning fails
whenever signals are bounded. Under general network topologies, learning dynamics
turn out to be more interesting and richer. The next theorem provides a partial con-
verse to Theorem 2 and shows that for a wide range of deterministic and stochastic
network topologies, bounded beliefs imply no asymptotic learning.
Theorem 5 Assume that the signal structure (F0,F1) has bounded private beliefs. If
the network topology {Qn}n∈N satisfies one of the following conditions,
(a) B(n) = {1, . . . , n− 1} for all n,
81
(b) |B(n)| ≤ 1 for all n, or
(c) there exists some constant M such that |B(n)| ≤M for all n and
lim
n→∞
max
b∈B(n)
b =∞ with probability 1,
then, asymptotic learning does not occur in any equilibrium σ ∈ Σ∗.
This theorem implies that in most common deterministic and stochastic network
topologies, bounded private beliefs imply lack of asymptotic learning. The three parts
of Theorem 5 are discussed and proved separately as propositions. Although Part (a) of
this theorem is already proved by Smith and Sorensen (2000), we provide an alternative
proof that highlights the importance of the concepts emphasized here.
The next proposition states the result corresponding to part (a) of Theorem 5.
Proposition 6 Assume that the signal structure (F0,F1) has bounded private beliefs
and B(n) = {1, . . . , n − 1} for all n. Then, asymptotic learning does not occur in any
equilibrium.
Proof. The proof consists of two steps. We first show that the lower and upper supports
of the social belief qn = Pσ(θ = 1|x1, ..., xn−1) are bounded away from 0 and 1. We next
show that this implies that xn does not converge to θ in probability.
Let xn−1 = (x1, ..., xn−1) denote the sequence of decisions up to and including n− 1.
Let ϕσ,xn−1(qn, xn) represent the social belief qn+1 given the social belief qn and the
decision xn, for a given strategy σ and decisions x
n−1. We use Bayes’ Rule to determine
the dynamics of the social belief. For any xn−1 compatible with qn, and xn = x with
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x ∈ {0, 1}, we have
ϕσ,xn−1(qn, x) = Pσ(θ = 1 | xn = x, qn, xn−1)
=
[
1 +
Pσ(xn = x, qn, xn−1, θ = 0)
Pσ(xn = x, qn, xn−1, θ = 1)
]−1
=
[
1 +
Pσ(qn, xn−1 | θ = 0)
Pσ(qn, xn−1 | θ = 1)
Pσ(xn = x | qn, xn−1, θ = 0)
Pσ(xn = x | qn, xn−1, θ = 1)
]−1
=
[
1 +
(
1
qn
− 1
)
Pσ(xn = x | qn, xn−1, θ = 0)
Pσ(xn = x | qn, xn−1, θ = 1)
]−1
. (5.1)
Let ασ,xn−1 denote the probability that agent n chooses x = 0 in equilibrium σ when he
observes history xn−1 and is indifferent between the two actions. Let
G−j (r) = lim
s↑r
Gj(s),
for any r ∈ [0, 1] and any j ∈ {0, 1}. Then, for any j ∈ {0, 1},
Pσ(xn = 0 | qn, xn−1, θ = j) = Pσ(pn < 1− qn | qn, θ = j)
+ασ,xn−1Pσ(pn = 1− qn | qn, θ = j)
= G−j (1− qn) + ασ,xn−1
[
Gj(1− qn)−G−j (1− qn)
]
.
From Lemma 3(a), dG0/dG1(r) = (1− r)/r for all r ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore,
1− r
r
≤ G0(r)
G1(r)
, and
G−0 (r)
G−1 (r)
≤ 1− β
β
.
Hence, for any ασ,xn−1 ,
Pσ(xn = 0 | qn, xn−1, θ = 0)
Pσ(xn = 0 | qn, xn−1, θ = 1) =
G−0 (1− qn) + ασ,xn−1
[
G0(1− qn)−G−0 (1− qn)
]
G−1 (1− qn) + ασ,xn−1
[
G1(1− qn)−G−0 (1− qn)
]
∈
[
qn
1− qn ,
1− β
β
]
.
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Combining this with Eq. (5.1), we obtain
ϕσ,xn−1(qn, 0) ∈
[(
1 +
(
1
qn
− 1
)(
1− β
β
))−1
,
(
1 +
(
1
qn
− 1
)(
qn
1− qn
))−1]
=
[
βqn
1− β − qn + 2βqn ,
1
2
]
Note that
βqn
1−β−qn+2βqn is an increasing function of qn and if qn ∈ [1− β, 1− β], then this
function is minimized at 1− β. This implies that
ϕσ,xn−1(qn, 0) ∈
[
β(1− β)
−β + β + 2β(1− β) ,
1
2
]
=
[
∆,
1
2
]
,
where ∆ is a constant strictly greater than 0. An analogous argument for xn = 1
establishes that there exists some ∆ < 1 such that if qn ∈ [1− β, 1− β], then
ϕσ,xn−1(qn, 1) ∈
[
1
2
,∆
]
.
We next show that qn ∈ [∆,∆] for all n. Suppose this is not true. Let N be the first
agent such that
qN ∈ [0,∆) ∪ (∆, 1] (5.2)
in some equilibrium and some realized history. Then, qN−1 ∈ [0, 1 − β) ∪ (1 − β, 1]
because otherwise, the dynamics of qn implies a violation of Eq. (5.2) for any xN−1. But
note that if qN−1 < 1− β, then by Lemma 1 agent N − 1 chooses action xN−1 = 0 and,
thus by Eq. (5.1),
qN =
[
1 +
(
1
qN−1
− 1
)
Pσ(xN−1 = 0 | qN−1, xN−2, θ = 0)
Pσ(xN−1 = 0 | qN−1, xN−2, θ = 1)
]−1
=
[
1 +
(
1
qN−1
− 1
)
1
1
]−1
= qN−1.
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By the same argument, if qN−1 > 1−β, we have that qN = qN−1. Therefore, qN = qN−1,
which contradicts the fact that N is the first agent that satisfies Eq. (5.2).
We next show that qn ∈ [∆,∆] for all n implies that xn does not converge in proba-
bility to θ. Let yk denote a realization of xk. Then, for any n and any sequence of yk’s,
we have
Pσ(θ = 1, xk = yk for all k ≤ n) ≤ ∆Pσ(xk = yk for all k ≤ n),
Pσ(θ = 0, xk = yk for all k ≤ n) ≤ (1−∆)Pσ(xk = yk for all k ≤ n).
By summing the preceding relations over all yk for k < n, we obtain
Pσ(θ = 1, xn = 1) ≤ ∆Pσ(xn = 1) and Pσ(θ = 0, xn = 0) ≤ (1−∆)Pσ(xn = 0).
Therefore, for any n, we have
Pσ(xn = θ) ≤ ∆Pσ(xn = 1) + (1−∆)Pσ(xn = 0) ≤ max{∆, 1−∆} < 1,
which completes the proof.
Briefly, this result follows by showing that under bounded private beliefs there exist
0 < ∆ < ∆ < 1 such that the social belief of each agent belongs to the interval [∆,∆].
This establishes that either individuals always make use of their own signals in taking
their actions, leading to a positive probability of a mistake, or individuals follow a
potentially incorrect social belief.
The next proposition shows that asymptotic learning fails when each individual ob-
serves the action of at most one agent from the past.
Proposition 7 Assume that the signal structure (F0,F1) has bounded private beliefs and
|B(n)| ≤ 1 for all n. Then, asymptotic learning does not occur in any equilibrium.
Proof. The first step is the following lemma.
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Lemma 9 Let B(n) = {b} for some n. We define
f(β, β) = max
{
1− β
2(1− β) ,
3
2
− 1
2β
}
, (5.3)
where β and β are the lower and upper supports of the private beliefs (cf. Definition 5).
Let σ be an equilibrium. Assume that Pσ(xb = θ) ≤ f(β, β). Then, we have
Pσ(xn = θ | B(n) = {b}) ≤ f(β, β).
Proof. We first assume that Pσ(xb = θ) = f(β, β) and show that this implies
Uσb ≥ β, and Lσb ≤ β, (5.4)
where Uσb and L
σ
b are defined in Eq. (3.13). We can rewrite U
σ
b as
Uσb =
Nσb
1− 2Pσ(xb = θ) + 2Nσb
=
Nσb
1− 2f(β, β) + 2Nσb
.
This is a decreasing function of Nσb and, therefore,
Uσb ≥
1
1− 2f(β, β) + 2 .
Using f(β, β) ≥ 3
2
− 1
2β
, the preceding relation implies Uσb ≥ β. An analogous argument
shows that Lσb ≤ β.
Since the support of the private beliefs is [β, β], using Lemma 3 and Eq. (5.4), there
exists an equilibrium σ′ = (σ′n, σ−n) such that xn = xb with probability one (with respect
to measure Pσ′). Since this gives an expected payoff Pσ′(xn = θ |B(n) = b) = Pσ(xb = θ),
it follows that, Pσ(xn = θ | B(n) = b) = Pσ(xb = θ). This establishes the claim that
if Pσ(xb = θ) = f(β, β), then Pσ(xn = θ | B(n) = {b}) = f(β, β). (5.5)
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We next assume that Pσ(xb = θ) < f(β, β). To arrive at a contradiction, suppose
that
Pσ(xn = θ | B(n) = {b}) > f(β, β). (5.6)
Now consider a hypothetical situation where agent n observes a private signal generated
with conditional probabilities (F0,F1) and a coarser version of the observation xb, i.e.,
the random variable x˜b distributed according to
P(x˜b = 1 | θ = 1) = 1−Y σb
[
1− f(β, β)
Pσ(xb = θ)
]
and P(x˜b = 0 | θ = 0) = 1−Nσb
[
1− f(β, β)
Pσ(xb = θ)
]
.
It follows from the preceding conditional probabilities that P(x˜b = θ) = f(β, β). We
assume that agent n uses the equilibrium strategy σn. Using a similar argument as in
the proof of Eq. (5.5), this implies that
P(xn = θ | B(n) = {b}) = f(β, β). (5.7)
Let z be a binary random variable with values {0, 1} and is generated independent of θ
with probabilities
P(z = 1) = 1− 2Y
σ
b
Pσ(xb = θ)
and P(z = 0) = 1− 2N
σ
b
Pσ(xb = θ)
.
This implies that P(z = j | θ = j) = P(z = j) for j ∈ {0, 1}. Using x˜b with prob-
ability 1
1+f(β,β)
[
2 +
(Y σb −1)Pσ(xb=θ)
Y σb
]
and z otherwise generates the original observation
(random variable) xb. Therefore, from Eq. (5.6), P(xn = θ|B(n) = {b}) > f(β, β),
which contradicts Eq. (5.7), and completes the proof.
Let f be defined in Eq. (5.3). We show by induction that
Pσ(xn = θ) ≤ f(β, β) for all n. (5.8)
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Suppose that for all agents up to n−1 the preceding inequality holds. Since |B(n)| ≤ 1,
we have
Pσ(xn = θ) = Pσ(xn = θ | B(n) = ∅)Qn(B(n) = ∅) (5.9)
+
n−1∑
b=1
Pσ(xn = θ | B(n) = b)Qn(B(n) = {b})
≤ Pσ(xn = θ | B(n) = ∅)Qn(B(n) = ∅) +
n−1∑
b=1
f(β, β)Qn(B(n) = {b}),
where the inequality follows from the induction hypothesis and Lemma 9. Note that
having B(n) = ∅ is equivalent to observing a decision b such that Pσ(xb = θ) = 1/2.
Since 1/2 ≤ f(β, β), Lemma 9 implies that Pσ(xn = θ|B(n) = ∅) ≤ f(β, β). Combined
with Eq. (5.9), this completes the induction.
Since the private beliefs are bounded, i.e., β > 0 and β < 1, we have f(β, β) < 1 [cf.
Eq. (5.3)]. Combined with Eq. (5.8), this establishes that lim infn→∞ Pσ(xn = θ) < 1,
showing that asymptotic learning does not occur at any equilibrium σ.
The proof of the result above follows by establishing an upper bound on the amount of
improvement in the ex ante probability of the correct action, hence providing a converse
to the Strong Improvement Principle (cf. Propositions 4 and 5). Under bounded private
beliefs, this upper bound is uniformly bounded away from 1, establishing no learning.
Finally, the following proposition establishes Part (c) of Theorem 5.
Proposition 8 Assume that the signal structure (F0,F1) has bounded private beliefs.
Assume that there exists some constant M such that |B(n)| ≤M for all n and
lim
n→∞
max
b∈B(n)
b =∞ with probability 1.
Then, asymptotic learning does not occur in any equilibrium.
Proof. We start with the following lemma, which will be used subsequently in the proof.
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Lemma 10 Assume that asymptotic learning occurs in some equilibrium σ, i.e., we
have limn→∞ Pσ(xn = θ) = 1. For some constant K, let D be the set of all subsets of
{1, ..., K}. Then,
lim
n→∞
min
D∈D
Pσ(xn = θ | xk = 1, k ∈ D) = 1.
Proof. First note that since the event xk = 1 for all k ≤ K is the intersection of events
xk = 1 for each k ≤ K,
min
D∈D
Pσ(xk = 1, k ∈ D) = Pσ(xk = 1, k ≤ K).
Let ∆ = Pσ(xk = 1, k ≤ K). Fix some D˜ ∈ D. Then,
Pσ(xk = 1, k ∈ D˜) ≥ ∆ > 0,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that there is a positive probability of
the first K agents choosing xn = 1. Let A = {0, 1}|D˜|, i.e., A is the set of all possible
actions for the set of agents D˜. Then,
Pσ(xn = θ) =
∑
ak∈A
Pσ(xn = θ | xk = ak, k ∈ D˜)Pσ(xk = ak, k ∈ D˜).
Since Pσ(xn = θ) converges to 1 and all elements in the sequence Pσ(xk = 1, k ∈ D˜) are
greater than or equal to ∆ > 0, it follows that the sequence Pσ(xn = θ | xk = 1, k ∈ D˜)
also converges to 1. Hence, for each  > 0, there exists some N(D˜) such that for all
n ≥ N(D˜),
Pσ(xn = θ | xk = 1, k ∈ D˜) ≥ 1− .
Therefore, for any  > 0,
min
D∈D
Pσ(xn = θ | xk = 1, k ∈ D) ≥ 1−  for all n ≥ max
D∈D
N(D),
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thus completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 8. To arrive at a contradiction, we assume that in some equi-
librium σ ∈ Σ∗, limn→∞ Pσ(xn = θ) = 1. The key part of the proof is to show that this
implies
lim
n→∞
Pσ(θ = 1 | xk = 1, k ∈ B(n)) = 1. (5.10)
To prove this claim, we show that for any  > 0, there exists some K˜() such that for
any neighborhood B with |B| ≤M and maxb∈B b ≥ K˜() we have
Pσ(θ = 1 | xk = 1, k ∈ B) ≥ 1− . (5.11)
In view of the assumption that maxb∈B(n) b converges to infinity with probability 1, this
implies the desired claim (5.10).
For a fixed  > 0, we define K˜() as follows: We recursively construct M thresholds
K0 < ... < KM−1 and let K˜() = KM−1. We consider an arbitrary neighborhood B with
|B| ≤M and maxb∈B b ≥ KM−1, and for each d ∈ {0, ...,M − 1}, define the sets
Bd = {b ∈ B : b ≥ Kd} and Cd = {b ∈ B : b < Kd−1},
where C0 = ∅. With this construction, it follows that there exists at least one d ∈
{0, ...,M − 1} such that B = Bd ∪ Cd, in which case we say B is of type d. We show
below that for any B of type d, we have
Pσ(θ = 1 | xk = 1, k ∈ Bd ∪ Cd) ≥ 1− , (5.12)
which implies the relation in (5.11).
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We first define K0 and show that for any B of type 0, relation (5.12) holds. Since
limn→∞ Pσ(xn = θ) = 1 by assumption, there exists some N0 such that for all n ≥ N0,
Pσ(xn = θ) ≥ 1− 
2M
.
Let K0 = N0. Let B be a neighborhood of type 0, implying that B = B0 and all
elements b ∈ B0 satisfy b ≥ K0. By using a union bound, the preceding inequality
implies
Pσ(xk = θ, k ∈ B0) ≥ 1−
∑
k∈B0
Pσ(xk 6= θ) ≥ 1− 
2
.
Hence, we have
Pσ(xk = θ, k ∈ B0 | θ = 1) 1
2
+ Pσ(xk = θ, k ∈ B0 | θ = 0) 1
2
≥ 1− 
2
,
and for any j ∈ {0, 1},
Pσ(xk = θ, k ∈ B0 | θ = j) ≥ 1− . (5.13)
Therefore, for any such B0,
Pσ(θ = 1 | xk = 1, k ∈ B0) =
[
1 +
Pσ(xk = 1, k ∈ B0 | θ = 0)Pσ(θ = 0)
Pσ(xk = 1, k ∈ B0 | θ = 1)Pσ(θ = 1)
]−1
≥
[
1 +

1− 
]−1
= 1− ,
showing that relation (5.12) holds for any B of type 0.
We proceed recursively, i.e., given Kd−1 we define Kd and show that relation (5.12)
holds for any neighborhood B of type d. Lemma 10 implies that
lim
n→∞
min
D⊆{1,...,Kd−1−1}
Pσ(xn = θ | xk = 1, k ∈ D) = 1.
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Therefore, for any δ > 0, there exists some Kd such that for all n ≥ Kd,
min
D⊆{1,...,Kd−1−1}
Pσ(xn = θ | xk = 1, k ∈ D) ≥ 1− δ.
From the equation above and definition of Cd it follows that for any Cd,
Pσ(xn = θ | xk = 1, k ∈ Cd) ≥ 1− δ.
By a union bound,
Pσ(xk = θ, k ∈ Bd | xk = 1, k ∈ Cd) ≥ 1−
∑
k∈Bd
Pσ(xk 6= θ | xk = 1, k ∈ Cd)
≥ 1− (M − d)δ.
Repeating the argument from Eq. (5.13), for any j ∈ {0, 1},
Pσ(xk = θ, k ∈ Bd | θ = j, xk = 1, k ∈ Cd) ≥ 1− (M − d)δPσ(θ = j | xk = 1, k ∈ Cd) .
Hence, for any such Bd,
Pσ(θ = 1 | xk = 1, k ∈ Bd ∪ Cd)
=
[
1 +
Pσ(xk = 1, k ∈ Bd | θ = 0, xk = 1, k ∈ Cd)Pσ(θ = 0, xk = 1, k ∈ Cd)
Pσ(xk = 1, k ∈ Bd | θ = 1, xk = 1, k ∈ Cd)Pσ(θ = 1, xk = 1, k ∈ Cd)
]−1
≥
1 + (M−d)δPσ(θ=0 | xk=1, k∈Cd)Pσ(θ = 0, xk = 1, k ∈ Cd)(
1− (M−d)δPσ(θ=1 | xk=1, k∈Cd)
)
Pσ(θ = 1, xk = 1, k ∈ Cd)
−1
= 1− (M − d)δ
Pσ(θ = 1 | xk = 1, k ∈ Cd) .
Choosing
δ =
(
1
M − d
)
min
D⊆{1,...,Kd−1−1}
Pσ(θ = 1 | xk = 1, k ∈ D),
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we obtain that for any neighborhood B of type d
Pσ(θ = 1 | xk = 1, k ∈ Bd ∪ Cd) ≥ 1− .
This proves that Eq. (5.12) holds for any neighborhood B of type d, and completing the
proof of Eq. (5.11) and therefore of Eq. (5.10).
Since the private beliefs are bounded, we have β > 0. By Eq. (5.10), there exists
some N such that
Pσ(θ = 1|xk = 1, k ∈ B(n)) ≥ 1−
β
2
for all n ≥ N.
Suppose the first N agents choose 1, i.e., xk = 1 for all k ≤ N , which is an event with
positive probability for any state of the world θ. We now prove inductively that this
event implies that xn = 1 for all n ∈ N. Suppose it holds for some n ≥ N . Then, by
Eq. (5.11),
Pσ(θ = 1 | sn+1) + Pσ(θ = 1 | xk = 1, ∈ B(n+ 1)) ≥ β + 1−
β
2
> 1.
By Lemma 1, this implies that xn+1 = 1. Hence, we conclude there is a positive probabil-
ity xn = 1 for all n ∈ N in any state of the world, contradicting limn→∞ Pσ(xn = θ) = 1,
and completing the proof.
The following corollary illustrates an implication of Theorem 5. It shows that, when
private beliefs are bounded, there will be no asymptotic learning (in any equilibrium) in
stochastic networks with random sampling.
Corollary 3 Assume that the signal structure (F0,F1) has bounded private beliefs. As-
sume that each agent n samples M agents uniformly and independently among {1, ..., n−
1}, for some M ≥ 1. Then, asymptotic learning does not occur in any equilibrium
σ ∈ Σ∗.
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Proof. For M = 1, the result follows from Theorem 5 part (b). For M ≥ 2, we show
that, under the assumption on the network topology, maxb∈B(n) b goes to infinity with
probability one. To arrive at a contradiction, suppose this is not true. Then, there exists
some K ∈ N and scalar  > 0 such that
Q
(
max
b∈B(n)
b ≤ K for infinitely many n
)
≥ .
By the Borel-Cantelli Lemma (see, e.g., Breiman, Lemma 3.14, p. 41), this implies that
∞∑
n=1
Qn
(
max
b∈B(n)
b ≤ K
)
=∞.
Since the samples are all uniformly drawn and independent, for all n ≥ 2,
Qn
(
max
b∈B(n)
b ≤ K
)
=
(
min{K,n− 1}
n− 1
)M
.
Therefore,
∞∑
n=1
Qn
(
max
b∈B(n)
b ≤ K
)
= 1 +
∞∑
n=1
(
min{K,n− 1}
n
)M
≤ 1 +
∞∑
n=1
(
K
n
)M
<∞,
where the last inequality holds since M ≥ 2. Hence, we obtain a contradiction. The
result follows by using Theorem 5 part (c).
5.2 Learning under Bounded Private Beliefs
We next show that with general stochastic topologies asymptotic learning is possible
even under bounded private beliefs. Let us first define the notion of a nonpersuasive
neighborhood.
Definition 9 A finite set B ⊂ N is a nonpersuasive neighborhood in equilibrium
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σ ∈ Σ∗ if
Pσ (θ = 1|xk = yk for all k ∈ B) ∈
(
1− β, 1− β)
for any set of values yk ∈ {0, 1} for each k. We denote the set of all nonpersuasive
neighborhoods by Uσ.
A neighborhood B is nonpersuasive in equilibrium σ ∈ Σ∗ if for any set of decisions
that agent n observes, his behavior still depends on her private signal. A nonpersua-
sive neighborhood is defined with respect to a particular equilibrium. However, it is
straightforward to see that B = ∅, i.e., the empty neighborhood, is nonpersuasive in
any equilibrium. The following two propositions present two classes of nonpersuasive
neighborhoods.
Proposition 9 Let (G0,G1) be private belief distributions. Assume that the first K
agents have empty neighborhoods, i.e., B(n) = ∅ for all n ≤ K, and K satisfies
K < min
 log
(
β
1−β
)
log
(
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
) , log
(
β
1−β
)
log
(
1−G0(1/2)
1−G1(1/2)
)
 . (5.14)
Then any subset B ⊆ {1, 2, ..., K} is a nonpersuasive neighborhood.
Proof. For simplicity, we assume in this proof that all agents break ties in favor of action
0. Relaxing this assumption does not change the result but requires more notation.
Using Bayes’ Rule and the assumption of equal priors on the state θ, we have that the
social belief given by observing neighborhood B, with actions xk = yk for each k ∈ B in
equilibrium σ is given by
Pσ (θ = 1|xk = yk for all k ∈ B) =
(
1 +
Pσ (xk = yk for all k ∈ B|θ = 0)
Pσ (xk = yk for all k ∈ B|θ = 1)
)−1
. (5.15)
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Since the neighborhoods of the agents in B are all empty, their actions are independent
conditional on the state θ. Hence,
Pσ (θ = 1|xk = yk for all k ∈ B) =
(
1 +
∏
k∈B Pσ (xk = yk|θ = 0)∏
k∈B Pσ (xk = yk|θ = 1)
)−1
.
Given the assumption that all agents break ties in favor of action 0, we can obtain that
for each agent n with an empty neighborhood, and each j ∈ {0, 1}, Pσ(x1 = 0|θ = j) =
Gj(1/2) and Pσ(x1 = 1|θ = j) = 1− Gj(1/2). Therefore, the social belief of Eq. (5.15)
can be rewritten as
Pσ (θ = 1|xk = yk for all k ∈ B) =
(
1 +
(1−G0(1/2))
∑
k∈B ykG0(1/2)|B|−
∑
k∈B yk
(1−G1(1/2))
∑
k∈B ykG1(1/2)|B|−
∑
k∈B yk
)−1
.
(5.16)
From Lemma 3(c), we have that
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
> 1 >
1−G0(1/2)
1−G1(1/2) ,
which combined with Eq. (5.16) implies
min
B⊆{1,...,K},{yk}k≤K∈{0,1}K
Pσ (θ = 1|xk = yk for all k ∈ B)
= Pσ (θ = 1|xk = 0 for all k ∈ {1, ..., K}) =
(
1 +
G0(1/2)K
G1(1/2)K
)−1
and
max
B⊆{1,...,K},{yk}k≤K∈{0,1}K
Pσ (θ = 1|xk = yk for all k ∈ B)
= Pσ (θ = 1|xk = 1 for all k ∈ {1, ..., K}) =
(
1 +
(1−G0(1/2))K
(1−G1(1/2))K
)−1
.
Therefore, any such neighborhood B ⊆ {1, ..., K} is nonpersuasive if it satisfies the
conditions
(
1 +
G0(1/2)K
G1(1/2)K
)−1
> 1− β and
(
1 +
(1−G0(1/2))K
(1−G1(1/2))K
)−1
< 1− β, (5.17)
96
which together yield Eq. (5.14).
To understand the inequality in Eq. (5.14) it is easier to consider the rearranged, but
equivalent, the pair of inequalities in Eq. (5.17). The factor of (1−(G0(1/2)/G1(1/2))K)−1
represents the probability that the state θ is equal to 1 conditional on K agents indepen-
dently selecting action 0. For such a neighborhood of K agents acting independently to
be nonpersuasive, there must exist a signal strong enough in favor of state 1 such that
an agent would select action 1 after observing K independent agents choosing 0. From
Lemma 1, we know this is possible if (1− (G0(1/2)/G1(1/2))K)−1 + β > 1. Repeat the
same argument for action 0 to obtain the second inequality in Eq. (5.17).
Proposition 10 Let (G0,G1) be private belief distributions. Assume that the first K
agents observe the full history of past actions, i.e., B(n) = {1, ..., n− 1} for all n ≤ K,
and K satisfies
K < min
 log
(
β
1−β
)
log
(
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
) , log
(
β
1−β
)
log
(
1−G0(1/2)
1−G1(1/2)
)
 . (5.18)
Assume also that the private belief distributions (G0,G1) satisfy the following mono-
tonicity conditions: the functions
(
1
q
− 1
)
G0(1− q)
G1(1− q) and
(
1
q
− 1
)
1−G0(1− q)
1−G1(1− q) (5.19)
are both nonincreasing in q. Then any subset B ⊆ {1, 2, ..., K} is a nonpersuasive
neighborhood.
Proof. As in the previous proposition, we assume in this proof for simplicity, and
without loss of generality, that all agents break ties in favor of action 0. We start
by showing inductively that all networks of the form {1, ..., n} for any n ≤ K are
nonpersuasive. In particular, we first show that for all n ≤ K, and any set of values
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yk ∈ {0, 1} for each k ≤ n,
Pσ(θ = 1|xk = yk for all k ≤ n) ≥
(
1 +
(
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
)n)−1
. (5.20)
The upper bound on Pσ(θ = 1|xk = yk for all k ≤ n) is symmetric and we do not prove
it to avoid repetition.
Note that Eq. (5.20) is trivially true for n = 0, i.e., Pσ(θ = 1) = 1/2. Assume that
Eq. (5.20) is true for n − 1 as an inductive hypothesis. We now show it is true for n.
Let the social belief given the neighborhood {1, ..., n} and decisions yn = (y1, ..., yn) be
given by q∗(yn) = Pσ(θ = 1|xk = yk for all k ≤ n). Then, using Bayes’ Rule, we obtain
that
1
q∗(yn)
− 1 =
(
1
q∗(yn−1)
− 1
)
Pσ(xn = yn|θ = 0, xk = yk for all k ≤ n− 1)
Pσ(xn = yn|θ = 1, xk = yk for all k ≤ n− 1) .
Since agent n observes the full history of past actions and breaks ties in favor of action
0, we have
1
q∗(yn)
− 1 =

(
1
q∗(yn−1) − 1
)
1−G0(1−q∗(yn−1))
1−G1(1−q∗(yn−1)) , if yn = 1;(
1
q∗(yn−1) − 1
)
G0(1−q∗(yn−1))
G1(1−q∗(yn−1)) , if yn = 0.
If yn = 1, then q
∗(yn) ≥ q∗(yn−1) because
1−G0(1− r))
1−G1(1− r)) ≤ 1 for any r ≥ β,
by Lemma 3(c). Using the inductive hypothesis,
q∗(yn) ≥ q∗(yn−1) ≥
(
1 +
(
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
)n−1)−1
≥
(
1 +
(
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
)n)−1
,
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thus proving Eq. (5.20) for yn = 1. If yn = 0, then we need to consider two separate
cases. Suppose first q∗(yn−1) < 1/2. Then, by Lemma 3(c), we have that
G0(1− q∗(yn−1))
G1(1− q∗(yn−1)) ≤
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
.
Combining the relation above with the inductive hypothesis, we obtain
(
1
q∗(yn−1)
− 1
)
G0(1− q∗(yn−1))
G1(1− q∗(yn−1)) ≤
(
1
q∗(yn−1)
− 1
)
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
≤
(
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
)n
,
thus proving that Eq. (5.20) holds in this case as well. Finally, consider the case where
q∗(yn−1) ≥ 1/2. Here, we use the monotonicity assumption from Eq. (5.19) to show that
1
q∗(yn)
−1 =
(
1
q∗(yn−1)
− 1
)
G0(1− q∗(yn−1))
G1(1− q∗(yn−1)) ≤
(
1
1/2
− 1
)
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
≤
(
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
)n
,
thus completing the proof of Eq. (5.20). We thus conclude that any neighborhood
{1, ..., n} is unpersuasive if n ≤ K and K satisfies
(
1 +
(
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
)K)−1
> 1− β,
as well as the symmetric (upper bound)
(
1 +
(
1−G0(1/2)
1−G1(1/2)
)K)−1
< 1− β.
Both conditions on K combined yield the condition of Eq. (5.18).
We have proved that the set {1, ..., K} is nonpersuasive given the conditions of the
proposition. We now show that any subset of B ⊆ {1, ..., K} is also nonpersuasive. To
prove this result, we bound by the worst possible event in terms of the actions of agents
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not B with respect to the social belief, i.e.,
Pσ(θ = 1|xk = yk for all k ∈ B)
=
∑
zn∈{0,1}{1,...,K}\B
Pσ(θ = 1|xk = yk for k ∈ B, xk = zk for k ∈ {1, ..., K}\B)
Pσ(xk = zk for all k ∈ {1, ..., K}\B|xk = yk for all k ∈ B)
≥ min
zn∈{0,1}{1,...,K}\B
Pσ(θ = 1|xk = yk for k ∈ B, xk = zk for k ∈ {1, ..., K}\B).
Use a symmetric bound to show the maximum value of the social belief. The proof is,
therefore, complete since we have previously proven that for the neighborhood {1, ..., K}
is unpersuasive.
The monotonicity condition of Eq. (5.19) guarantees the following: let 0 ≤ q′ ≤ q′′ ≤
1; then Pσ(θ = 1|qn = q′, xn = 0) ≤ Pσ(θ = 1|qn = q′′, xn = 0) and Pσ(θ = 1|qn =
q′, xn = 1) ≤ Pσ(θ = 1|qn = q′′, xn = 1). That is, an agent n with a given social belief
qn = q
′ selecting action 0 (or action 1) represents a stronger signal in favor of state θ = 0
than an agent with social belief qn = q
′′ ≥ q′ choosing action 0 (or, respectively, action
1).
Our main theorem for learning with bounded beliefs, which we state next, provides
a class of stochastic social networks where asymptotic learning takes place even under
bounded private beliefs.
Theorem 6 Let (F0,F1) be an arbitrary signal structure. Let M be a positive integer
and let C1, ..., CM be sets such that Ci ∈ Uσ for all i = 1, . . . ,M for some equilibrium
σ ∈ Σ∗. For each i = 1, . . . ,M , let {ri(n)} be a sequence of non-negative numbers such
that
lim
n→∞
M∑
i=1
ri(n) = 0 and
∞∑
n=1
M∑
i=1
ri(n) =∞, (5.21)
with
∑M
i=1 ri(n) ≤ 1 for all n and ri(n) = 0 for all n ≤ maxb∈Cib. Assume the network
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topology satisfies
B(n) =
 Ci, with probability ri(n) for each i from 1 to M ,{1, 2, ..., n− 1}, with probability 1−∑Mi=1 ri(n).
Then, asymptotic learning occurs in equilibrium σ.
Clearly, this theorem could have been stated with Ci = ∅ for all i = 1, . . . ,m, which
would correspond to agent n making a decision without observing anybody else’s action
with some probability r(n) =
∑M
i=1 ri(n) ≤ 1.
This is a rather surprising result, particularly in view of existing results in the liter-
ature, which generate herds and information cascades (and no learning) with bounded
beliefs. This theorem indicates that learning dynamics become significantly richer when
we consider general social networks. In particular, certain stochastic network topologies
enable a significant amount of new information to arrive into the network, because some
agents make decisions with limited information (nonpersuasive neighborhoods). As a
result, the relevant information can be aggregated in equilibrium, leading to individuals’
decisions eventually converging to the right action (in probability).
Proof of Theorem 6. To simplify the exposition of the proof, we assume that the
corresponding private belief distributions (G0,G1) are continuous, which implies that
the equilibrium is unique.
For each n, let xn = (x1, . . . , xn) represent the sequence of decisions up to and
including xn. Let q
∗(xn) denote the “social belief” when xn is observed under equilibrium
σ, i.e.,
q∗(xn) = Pσ(θ = 1 | xn).
The social belief q∗(xn) is a martingale and, by the martingale convergence theorem,
converges with probability 1 to some random variable qˆ. Conditional on θ = 1, the
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likelihood ratio
1− q∗(xn)
q∗(xn)
=
Pσ(θ = 0 | xn)
Pσ(θ = 1 | xn)
is also a martingale [see Doob, 1953, Eq. (7.12)]. Therefore, conditional on θ = 1, the
ratio (1−q∗(xn))/q∗(xn) converges with probability 1 to some random variable (1−qˆ1)/qˆ1.
In particular, we have
Eσ
[
1− qˆ1
qˆ1
]
<∞,
[see Breiman, Theorem 5.14], and therefore qˆ1 > 0 with probability 1. Similarly,
q∗(xn)/(1 − q∗(xn)) is a martingale conditional on θ = 0 and converges with proba-
bility 1 to some random variable qˆ0/(1− qˆ0), where qˆ0 < 1 with probability 1. Therefore,
Pσ(qˆ > 0 | θ = 1) = 1 and Pσ(qˆ < 1 | θ = 0) = 1. (5.22)
The key part of the proof is to show that the support of qˆ is contained in the set {0, 1}.
This fact combined with Eq. (5.22) guarantees that qˆ = θ (i.e., the agents that observe
the entire history eventually know what the state of the world θ is).
To show that the support of qˆ is contained in {0, 1}, we study the evolution dynamics
of q∗(xn). Suppose xn+1 = 0. Using Bayes’ Rule twice, we have
q∗ ((xn, 0)) =
Pσ(xn+1 = 0, xn | θ = 1)∑1
j=0 Pσ(xn+1 = 0, xn | θ = j)
=
[
1 +
Pσ(xn+1 = 0, xn | θ = 0)
Pσ(xn+1 = 0, xn | θ = 1)
]−1
=
[
1 +
(
1
q∗(xn)
− 1
)
Pσ(xn+1 = 0 | θ = 0, xn)
Pσ(xn+1 = 0 | θ = 1, xn)
]−1
.
To simplify notation, let
fn(x
n) =
Pσ(xn+1 = 0 | θ = 0, xn)
Pσ(xn+1 = 0 | θ = 1, xn) , (5.23)
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so that
q∗ ((xn, 0)) =
[
1 +
(
1
q∗(xn)
− 1
)
fn(x
n)
]−1
. (5.24)
We next show that if q∗(xn) ≥ 1/2 for some n, we have
fn(x
n) ≥ 1 + δ for some δ > 0, (5.25)
which will allow us to establish a bound on the difference between q∗(xn) and q∗((xn, 0)).
By conditioning on the neighborhood B(n+ 1), we have for any j ∈ {0, 1},
Pσ(xn+1 = 0 | θ = j, xn) =
M∑
i=1
ri(n+ 1)Pσ(xn+1 = 0 | θ = j, xn, B(n+ 1) = Ci)
+
(
1−
M∑
i=1
ri(n+ 1)
)
Pσ(xn+1 = 0 | θ = j, xn, B(n+ 1) = {1, ..., n}).
For each i = 1, . . . ,M , we define
qi(x
n) = Pσ(θ = 1|xk, k ∈ Ci).
Using the assumption that G0 and G1 are continuous, Lemma 1 implies that
Pσ(xn+1 = 0 | θ = j, xn, B(n+ 1) = Ci)
= Pσ(pn+1 ≤ 1− qi(xn) | θ = j, xn, B(n+ 1) = Ci) = Gj (1− qi(xn)) .
Therefore,
Pσ(xn+1 = 0 | θ = j, xn) =
M∑
i=1
ri(n+ 1)Gj(1− qi(xn)) +
(
1−
M∑
i=1
ri(n+ 1)
)
Gj(1− q∗(xn)).
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Hence, Eq. (5.23) can be rewritten as
fn(x
n) =
∑M
i=1 ri(n+ 1)G0(1− qi(xn)) +
(
1−∑Mi=1 ri(n+ 1))G0(1− q∗(xn))∑M
i=1 ri(n+ 1)G1(1− qi(xn)) +
(
1−∑Mi=1 ri(n+ 1))G1(1− q∗(xn)) .
LetN ⊆ N be the set of all n such that∑Mi=1 ri(n) ∈ (0, 1). The setN has infinitely many
elements in view of the assumptions that limn→∞
∑M
i=1 ri(n) = 0 and
∑∞
n=1
∑M
i=1 ri(n) =
∞ [cf. Eq. (5.21)]. To simplify notation, let ωi(n) = ri(n)/(1−
∑M
k=1 rk(n)) for all n ∈ N .
Note that for all n ∈ N , there exists some i such that ωi(n) > 0. Then, for any n ∈ N ,
fn(x
n) =
∑M
i=1 ωi(n+ 1)G0(1− qi(xn)) +G0(1− q∗(xn))∑M
i=1 ωi(n+ 1)G1(1− qi(xn)) +G1(1− q∗(xn))
. (5.26)
If q∗(xn) ≥ 1/2, it follows from Lemma 3(c) that
G0(1− q∗(xn)) ≥
(
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
)
G1(1− q∗(xn)). (5.27)
Furthermore, since Ci is a nonpersuasive neighborhood, we have
qi(x
n) ∈ (1− β, 1− β) for all xn,
which implies the existence of some c′i with infxn qi(x
n) = c′i > 1 − β, where the strict
inequality follows since the infimum is over a finite set. Lemma 3(c) then implies that
G0(1− qi(xn)) ≥
(
G0(1− c′i)
G1(1− c′i)
)
G1(1− qi(xn)). (5.28)
Combining Eqs. (5.26), (5.27) and (5.28), we see that for all n ∈ N with q∗(xn) ≥ 1/2,
fn(x
n) ≥
∑M
i=1 ωi(n+ 1)
(
G0(1−c′i)
G1(1−c′i)
)
G1(1− qi(xn)) +
(
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
)
G1(1− q∗(xn))∑M
i=1 ωi(n+ 1)G1(1− qi(xn)) +G1(1− q∗(xn))
.
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Notice the right-hand side of the equation above is merely a weighted average. Therefore,
if n ∈ N and q∗(xn) ≥ 1/2, then
fn(x
n) ≥ min
{
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
, min
i∈{1,...,M}
G0(1− c′i)
G1(1− c′i)
}
= 1 + δ,
for some δ > 0 using Lemma 3(c), proving Eq. (5.25).
Combining Eq. (5.25) with Eq. (5.24) yields
q∗ ((xn, 0)) ≤
[
1 +
(
1
q∗(xn)
− 1
)
(1 + δ)
]−1
for all n ∈ N , q∗(xn) ≥ 1/2. (5.29)
Suppose now n ∈ N and q∗(xn) ∈ [1/2, 1− ] for some  > 0. We show that there exists
some constant K(δ, ) > 0 such that
q∗(xn)− q∗ ((xn, 0)) ≥ K(δ, ). (5.30)
Define g : [1/2, 1− ]→ [0, 1] as
g(q) = q −
[
1 +
(
1
q
− 1
)
(1 + δ)
]−1
.
It can be seen that g(q) is a concave function over q ∈ [1/2, 1− ]. Let K(δ, ) be
K(δ, ) = inf
q∈[1/2,1−]
g(q) = min{g(1/2), g(1− )} = min
{
δ
2(2 + δ)
,
δ(1− )
1 + δ
}
> 0.
From Eq. (5.29), it follows that
q∗(xn)− q∗ ((xn, 0)) ≥ q∗(xn)−
[
1 +
(
1
q∗(xn)
− 1
)
(1 + δ)
]−1
≥ g (q∗(xn)) ≥ K(δ, ),
thus proving Eq. (5.30).
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Recall that q∗(xn) converges to qˆ with probability 1. We show that for any  > 0,
the support of qˆ does not contain (1/2, 1− ). Assume, to arrive at a contradiction, that
it does. Consider a sample path that converges to a value in the interval (1/2, 1 − ).
For this sample path, there exists some N such that for all n ≥ N , q∗(xn) ∈ [1/2, 1 −
]. By the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, there are infinitely many agents n within N that
observe a neighborhood Ci for some i because the neighborhoods are independent and∑∞
n=1
∑M
i=1 ri(n) =∞. Since these are nonpersuasive neighborhoods, an infinite subset
will choose action 0. Therefore, for infinitely many n that satisfy n ≥ N and n ∈ N , by
Eq. (5.30),
q∗(xn+1) ≤ q∗(xn)−K(δ, ).
But this implies the sequence q∗(xn) is not Cauchy and, therefore, contradicts the fact
that q∗(xn) is a convergent sequence. Hence, we conclude that the support of qˆ does not
contain (1/2, 1 − ). Since this argument holds for any  > 0, the support of qˆ cannot
contain (1/2, 1). A similar argument leads to the conclusion that the support of qˆ does
not include (0, 1/2]. Therefore, the support of qˆ is a subset of the set {0, 1}. By Eq.
(5.22), this implies that qˆ = θ with probability 1.
We finally show that qˆ = θ with probability 1 implies the convergence of actions xn
to θ in probability. Suppose first θ = 1. Then, q∗(xn) converges to 1 with probability 1.
Therefore, Pσ(pn+1 + q∗(xn) ≥ 1 | θ = 1) converges to 1. Therefore, for any n,
Pσ(xn = θ | θ = 1) ≥ Pσ(xn = θ | θ = 1, B(n) = {1, ..., n− 1})Q(B(n) = {1, ..., n− 1})
= Pσ(pn+1 + q∗(xn) ≥ 1|θ = 1)
(
1−
M∑
i=1
ri(n)
)
.
Since
∑M
i=1 ri(n) converges to 0, the preceding relation implies that Pσ(xn = θ | θ = 1)
converges to 1. By the same argument, Pσ(xn = θ | θ = 0) also converges to 1, thus
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proving asymptotic learning occurs in equilibrium σ.
It is important to emphasize the difference between this result and that in Sgroi
(2002), which shows that a social planner can ensure some degree of information ag-
gregation by forcing a subsequence of agents to make decisions without observing past
actions. With the same reasoning, one might conjecture that asymptotic learning may
occur if a particular subsequence of agents, such as that indexed by prime numbers, has
empty neighborhoods. However, there will not be asymptotic learning in this determin-
istic topology since lim infn→∞ Pσ(xn = θ) < 1. For the result that there is asymptotic
learning (i.e., lim infn→∞ Pσ(xn = θ) = 1) in Theorem 6, the feature that the network
topology is stochastic is essential.
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Chapter 6
Heterogeneity of Preferences
6.1 The Role of Preferences
In the model of social learning introduced in Chapter 2 and analyzed in Chapters 3-5, all
agents have the same preferences. This assumption allowed us to focus on information
dynamics in a context where actions were selected based on beliefs about the state of
the world. However, in most real-life learning problems, different individuals also have
different preferences over possible states of the world. For example, when a consumer
decides on a new product to purchase, his choice is not merely a function of whether
the product will yield long-term value, but it also rests on whether this product fits
this consumer’s particular needs. The element of personal preferences arises in contexts
as varied as choosing an operating system for your computer, where a given operating
system is best suited for a particular type of user, or selecting a retirement fund, where
different risk-reward profiles are recommended based on a person’s age and wealth, or
picking a political party, where different individuals would prefer different tax rates.
Once we incorporate the element of diverse preferences into our social learning model,
each individual agent faces a more complex task when trying to estimate the state from
the actions of her peers. Suppose you observe a person entering a Japanese restaurant
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rather than the similarly priced Italian alternative next door. When learning from his
action, you have to consider whether the person selected that option because he believes
the Japanese restaurant serves meals of higher quality or because he enjoys eating sushi
more than eating pasta. If the former explanation is true, then his action is informative
and you should consider following him into the Japanese parlor, but if the latter reason is
correct, then his action is completely uninformative and you should completely disregard
his action. Therefore, a given action is less informative about the state of the world in a
context of private preferences and it would be natural that rational agents would perform
worse (learn less) than they would in an environment without private preferences.
The intuition above is confirmed in Smith and Sorensen (2000) where diverse types
generically lead agents to an equilibrium called confounded learning. That is, the history
of actions eventually becomes uninformative about the state because agents cannot
determine whether the actions are a product of the signals (and therefore correlated to
the state of the world) or a consequence of the diverse preferences. Therefore, diverse
preferences are an obstacle to social learning in this model.
However, a key assumption in Smith and Sorensen’s model is that preferences are
not “monotonic in the state”. For example, suppose an agent n of type A would select
action xn = θ if she knew the state θ, but a different agent m of type B would choose
action xn = 1 − θ if she knew the state. That is, if we increase the likelihood that
state is equal to 1 rather than 0, some agents will react by changing their actions from
0 to 1, while others will do exactly the opposite and change their actions from 1 to 0.
This phenomenon reduces an agent’s power to make inferences on the state based on
the actions of others.
In this chapter we consider preferences that are monotonic on the state. Monotonic
preferences satisfy the following property: for a given belief about the state of the world
different agents might select different actions, but if we increase the probability that
the state is 1, then all agents either maintain their current actions or change to action
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1. Preferences are monotonic in many scenarios where agents have to learn from their
peers. For example, given a belief about the quality of a given product, some individuals
would choose to buy it, while others would not. However, if the belief about the product
quality decreases, no one will become more likely to buy it than they previously were.
The selection of a financial product is also a good example. Different people have distinct
risk-reward preferences, but everyone prefers higher returns to lower returns.
We study the problem of learning under diverse preferences with two different models
for the social network topology. In Section 6.3, we assume agents observe only the action
of their immediate neighbors. In this case, the na¨ıve intuition that diverse preferences
hinder learning is indeed verified. We first show that no learning occurs under bounded
private beliefs. This result is based on the intuitive notion that learning from a single
agent is less informative if her preferences are unknown. We then show by means of an
example that asymptotic learning might fail even under unbounded beliefs given diverse
preferences.
In Section 6.4, we assume agents observe the entire history of past actions. Under
this topology, we show that diverse preferences improve learning. The wider the support
of preferences, the higher will be the probability that an agent n will choose the best
action, for large n.1 In particular, if preferences are very diverse, learning occurs for
any signal structure. The rationale behind this result is the following: heterogeneous
preferences reduces the ability of the first few agents to learn from the actions of others;
the immediate consequence is that these agents need to give greater consideration to their
own private signals; for an agent that comes later into the game (large n), the history
will contain more information about the signals and, therefore, yield more learning.
1Note that this is a set-valued result, please see Section 6.4 for the precise statement.
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6.2 Formulation
The model studied in this chapter is an extension of the one introduced in Chapter
2. A countably infinite number of agents, indexed by n ∈ N, sequentially make a
single decision (take an action). Each agent n has a type tn ∈ R and makes a decision
xn ∈ {0, 1}. The payoff of agent n depends on her type, her decision and some underlying
state of the world θ. Similarly to the model in Chapter 2, we assume that both values
of the underlying state are equally likely, so that P(θ = 0) = P(θ = 1) = 1/2. For each
n, the payoff of agent n is
u(tn, xn, θ) =
 (1− θ) + tn, if xn = 0,θ + (1− tn), if xn = 1.
Note that this utility function has two components: the first one depends on whether
xn = θ and the second one depends on tn and whether xn = 1. This means agents
need to balance between two objectives, they all want to choose their actions xn equal
to the state θ, but they also have a preference for choosing one particular action. The
type tn indicates how agent n makes this trade-off: if the type tn = 1/2, agent n is
neutral between actions 0 and 1 and, therefore, makes her choice solely based on which
action is more likely to realize xn = θ; the higher her value of tn, the more she prefers
decision 0. If the value of tn is greater than or equal to 1, then agent n’s preference
for action 0 always overrides her preference for xn = θ and, therefore she will certainly
choose that action. In this case, we say agent n is committed to action 0. Similarly,
if tn ≤ 0, then agent n is committed to action 1. For simplicity, we assume all agents
are non-committed, i.e., tn ∈ (0, 1) for all n. Our results can easily be extended to
include committed agents if we modify slightly the definition of asymptotic learning by
considering only the convergence of actions of the non-committed agents.
The types {tn} are independently generated according to probability measure H.
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For each n, the type tn is private information of agent n. The measure H is common
knowledge. We assume that H has full support in some range [γ, γ], where 0 ≤ γ ≤
1/2 ≤ γ ≤ 1. The support of the distribution H, [γ, γ], is a measure of the diversity
of preferences. If both γ and γ are close to 1/2, then all agents are close to indifferent
between the two possible actions prior to receiving information about the state θ. If, on
the other hand, γ is close to 0 and γ is close 1, then there are agents with strong prior
preference for one of the two choices in the action set.
Definition 10 The preferences are said to be unbounded if γ = 0 and γ = 1. The
preferences are said to be bounded if γ > 0 and γ < 1.
The concept of unbounded preferences should not be confused with the notion of
unbounded private beliefs. Unbounded preferences indicates that there are agents ar-
bitrarily more likely to take each one of the possible actions before they know any
information about the state. Unbounded private beliefs means that there are arbitrarily
strong signals in favor of both actions. If agent n knew that agent b chose action 0
because of a very strong signal, she would be inclined to follow suit since it indicates
the state is likely to be θ = 0. However, if agent n knew that agent b selected action 0
because of a strong personal preference, agent n should disregard decision b’s action as
it is uninformative about the state. In our model, both types and signals are private,
so agents make Bayesian estimates of the likelihood of each scenario and make decisions
based on their estimates.
Apart from the private types and the modified utility functions, the model analyzed
in this chapter is the same as the one described in Chapter 2. Each agent n obtains a
signal sn ∈ S generated from one of two probability measures, F0 or F1, conditional on
the state θ. An agent n also observes the actions of agents in a neighborhood B(n). The
information set In of agent n is composed of his type tn, signal sn, neighborhoodB(n) and
all decisions of agents xk for k ∈ B(n). We analyze the pure-strategy perfect Bayesian
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equilibria and denote the set of equilibria by Σ∗. The following lemma establishes the
equilibrium decision rule used by the agents.
Lemma 11 Let σ ∈ Σ∗ be an equilibrium of the game. Let In ∈ In be an information
set of agent n. Then, the decision of agent n, xn = σ(In), satisfies
xn =
 1, if Pσ(θ = 1 | sn, B(n), xk for all k ∈ B(n)) > tn,0, if Pσ(θ = 1 | sn, B(n), xk for all k ∈ B(n)) < tn,
and xn ∈ {0, 1} otherwise.
Proof. Agent n maximizes her expected utility given her information set and the
equilibrium σ ∈ Σ∗ and, thus, selects action 1 if Eσ[(1− θ) + tn|In] > Eσ[θ+ (1− tn)|In],
where Eσ represents the expected value in a given equilibrium σ ∈ Σ∗. The agent n
knows her type tn and, therefore, the previous condition is equivalent to Eσ[θ|In] > tn.
Since θ is an indicator function and tn is independent of θ, we have that Eσ[θ|In] =
Pσ(θ = 1 | sn, B(n), xk for all k ∈ B(n)), proving the clause for xn = 1. The proof for
the case xn = 0 is identical with the inequalities reversed.
Agent n’s posterior belief Pσ(θ = 1 | sn, B(n), xk for all k ∈ B(n)) can be de-
composed in two parts, the private belief pn = Pσ(θ = 1 | sn)) and the social belief
qn = Pσ(θ = 1 | B(n), xk for all k ∈ B(n)). The following lemma shows the equilibrium
decision rule in terms of the type, private and social beliefs.
Lemma 12 Let σ ∈ Σ∗ be an equilibrium of the game. Let In ∈ In be an information
set of agent n. Then, the decision of agent n, xn = σ(In), satisfies
xn =
 1, if pn >
tn(1−qn)
tn(1−2qn)+qn ,
0, if pn <
tn(1−qn)
tn(1−2qn)+qn ,
and xn ∈ {0, 1} otherwise.
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To avoid repetition, we refer the reader to the proof of Lemma 1, which is very
similar. The only difference in the two results is that while in Lemma 1 the threshold
on agent n’s posterior belief is 1/2, here it is tn.
In the next two sections, we study respectively the role of preferences under the
immediate neighbor network topology, i.e., B(n) = {n−1} and under the full information
topology, i.e., B(n) = {1, ..., n− 1}.
6.3 Observing a Single Agent
In this section, we show that diverse preferences hinder learning under the immediate
neighbor network topology, i.e., B(n) = {n− 1}.
We first show that if the private beliefs are bounded, agents do not learn the state
irrespective of the distribution of private preferences H.
Theorem 7 Suppose the private beliefs are bounded and the network topology satisfies
B(n) = {n − 1} for all n ∈ N. Then, asymptotic learning does not occur in any
equilibrium σ ∈ Σ∗.
Proof. The first step of the proof is to show that agent n’s ex ante probability of choosing
the best action is maximized with type tn = 1/2. We first condition Pσ(xn+1 = θ) on
sn+1 and xn,
Pσ(xn+1 = θ) =
1∑
x=0
∫
s∈S
Pσ(xn+1 = θ|sn+1 = s, xn = x)dPσ(sn+1 = s, xn = x), (6.1)
and observe that for any x ∈ {0, 1} and any s ∈ S,
Pσ(xn+1 = θ|sn+1 = s, xn = x) ≤ max
y∈{0,1}
Pσ(y = θ|sn+1 = s, xn = x) (6.2)
since xn+1 is a function solely of xn, sn+1 and tn+1 (tn+1 being independent from
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θ, xnandsn+1). Note that if tn+1 = 1/2, the agent solves exactly this maximization
problem, i.e.,
Pσ(xn+1 = θ|sn+1 = s, xn = x, tn+1 = 1/2) = max
y∈{0,1}
Pσ(y = θ|sn+1 = s, xn = x). (6.3)
Combining Eqs. (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3) we obtain
Pσ(xn+1 = θ) ≤
1∑
x=0
∫
s∈S
Pσ(xn+1 = θ|sn+1 = s, xn = x, tn+1 = 1/2)dPσ(sn+1 = s, xn = x),
which integrates out to
Pσ(xn+1 = θ) ≤ Pσ(xn+1 = θ|tn+1 = 1/2). (6.4)
The integration is valid since xn and sn+1 are independent of tn+1. We have thus shown
that having type tn+1 = 1/2 maximizes agent n+1’s probability of choosing the optimal
action given the state.
We now invoke Lemma 9 from the Appendix to complete the result. The lemma was
proved in the context of a single utility function for all agents and, thus, we need to add
the condition tn+1 = 1/2 to adapt it to the model with heterogeneous preferences. From
Lemma 9 we obtain that if Pσ(xn = θ) ≤ f(β, β), then,
Pσ(xn+1 = θ | tn+1 = 1/2) ≤ f(β, β), (6.5)
where the function f is defined as
f(β, β) = max
{
1− β
2(1− β) ,
3
2
− 1
2β
}
.
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Combining Eqs. (6.4) and (6.5), we obtain that if Pσ(xn = θ) ≤ f(β, β), then
Pσ(xn+1 = θ) ≤ Pσ(xn+1 = θ | tn+1 = 1/2) ≤ f(β, β).
We can apply this result inductively to obtain that Pσ(xn = θ) ≤ f(β, β) for all n ∈ N
– note: the base case is a random variable x0 that is equally likely to be 0 or 1 and is
independent of θ. The proof is thus complete, since f(β, β) < 1 when the private beliefs
are bounded.
In the theorem above, we proved that no distribution of preferences H will lead to
learning when the private beliefs are bounded in the immediate neighbors topology. We
next address the question of whether diverse preferences can stop asymptotic learning
when both private beliefs and preferences are unbounded. We show by means of an
example that learning might not occur with unbounded preferences and private beliefs.
Example 3 For each n, assume the type tn is generated from a uniform distribution
between 0 and 1. Furthermore, let the signal sn ∈ [0, 1] be generated by the following
signal structure:
F0(sn) = 2sn − s2n and F1(sn) = s2n.
In this example, the signals are identical to the private beliefs, i.e., pn(sn) = sn. There-
fore, the state-conditional distributions of private signals [cf. Eq. (2.8)] are
G0(r) = 2r − r2 and G1(r) = r2. (6.6)
Using the decision rule stated in Lemma 12, the probability of agent n making the
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correct decision is given by
Pσ(xn = θ) =
1
2
1∑
x=0
Pσ
(
pn ≤ tn(1− qn)
tn(1− 2qn) + qn
∣∣∣∣xn−1 = x, θ = 0)Pσ(xn−1 = x|θ = 0)
+
1
2
1∑
x=0
Pσ
(
pn >
tn(1− qn)
tn(1− 2qn) + qn
∣∣∣∣xn−1 = x, θ = 1)Pσ(xn−1 = x|θ = 1).
Because of the symmetry of the signal structure (as well as continuity of private belief
distributions which guarantee a unique equilibrium), we have that
Pσ(xn = θ) =
1∑
x=0
Pσ
(
pn >
tn(1− qn)
tn(1− 2qn) + qn
∣∣∣∣xn = x, θ = 1)Pσ(xn−1 = x|θ = 1).
Based on symmetry, we also obtain that Pσ(xn−1 = 1|θ = 1) = 1−Pσ(xn−1 = 0|θ = 1) =
Pσ(xn−1 = θ) and that qn = Pσ(xn−1 = θ) when xn−1 = 1 and qn = 1 − Pσ(xn−1 = θ)
when xn−1 = 0. By conditioning on tn and substituting the private belief distribution,
we obtain that
Pσ(xn = θ) =
∫ 1
t=0
(α− 1)2t(3αt− 2α− t)
(2αt− α− t) dH(t),
where α = Pσ(xn−1 = θ). Solving this integral we obtain that Pσ(xn = θ) = r(Pσ(xn−1 =
θ)), where the mapping r is defined below
r(α) =
12α3 − 18α2 + 8α− 1− 4α2(1− α)2 ln ( 1
α
− 1)
(2α− 1)3 .
The mapping r is plotted in Figure 6.1. The function r has two fixed points at 0.7196
and 1, and lies below the identity line in (0.7196, 1). The implication of this curve is that
an agent n observing the action of an agent n−1 has a lower probability of choosing the
optimal action given the state than his neighbor if Pσ(xn = θ) ∈ (0.7196, 1). Therefore,
the fixed point at 0.7196 is stable, but the one at 1 is not. The implication is that the
improvement principle, which was at the heart of the Theorem 2, does not hold in this
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Figure 6-1: This graph shows the lack of improvement principle in a model with hetero-
geneous preferences.
model. Asymptotic learning does not occur and limn→∞ Pσ(xn = θ) = 0.7196 for this
particular signal structure.
6.4 Observing the Full History
In Section 6.3, we showed that diverse preferences have a negative effect on learning in
a network where agents observes only the action of their immediate neighbors. Here, we
show that heterogeneous preferences facilitate learning when agents can observe all past
actions.
To simplify the proofs, we assume that H, G0 and G1 have densities. This assumption
guarantees unique equilibrium.
Lemma 13 Assume that B(n) = {1, ..., n− 1} for all n ∈ N. Then, the social belief qn
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converges with probability 1.
Proof. The social belief qn is a non-negative martingale adapted to the filtration gen-
erated by the sequence of decisions (x1, . . . , xn−1) and, by the martingale convergence
theorem, converges with probability 1.
We denote the limit of {qn} by the random variable qˆ. We now show several lemmas
on the support of the limiting social belief qˆ.
The intuition behind the results to follow (Lemmas 14 and 15) is captured in Figure
6.2. In the network topology where agents observe the entire history of past actions, the
dynamics of the social belief sequence {qn} can be described by a pair of curves that
map the social belief of an agent n, qn, to the social belief of agent n + 1, qn+1. The
lower curve maps the value of qn into qn+1 if xn = 0, while the upper curve maps the
value of qn into qn+1 if xn = 1. That is, the pair of curves incorporate the the action xn
into the social belief qn to form the next agent’s social belief qn+1.
Lemma 13 establishes that the sequence {qn} converges with probability 1 to some
random variable qˆ. Therefore, for almost all realizations, the sequence {qn} must be a
converging sequence. However, the sequence {qn} can only converge to a point where at
least one of the mappings, the xn = 0 or the xn = 1, is equal to the identity (represented
by the dashed line in Figure 6.2). A convergent sequence of real numbers is Cauchy, so
the sequence |qn+1−qn| must to go to 0. If the sequence {qn} were to converge to a point
where neither mapping is equal to the identity, it would contradict the convergence of
|qn+1 − qn| to 0.
Lemmas 14 and 15 show that the support of qˆ is contained in the union of the
two highlighted regions on the horizontal axis of Figure 6.2. Lemma 14, in particular,
uses the reasoning outlined above to prove that the support of qˆ does not contain any
intermediary points between the two highlighted intervals. An important consequence of
this lemma is that agents, in the limit as n grows to infinity, ignore their private beliefs
and types. The sequence of social beliefs {qn} converges, with probability 1, to a region
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Figure 6-2: The dynamics of the social beliefs are captured by two mappings from qn
to qn+1, one for the case where xn = 0 and the other one for the case where xn = 1.
Lemmas 14 and 15 show that the highlighted regions on the horizontal axis contain the
support of qˆ.
where it overwhelms any agent’s private information.
Lemma 14 Assume that B(n) = {1, ..., n− 1} for all n ∈ N. Then, the limiting social
belief qˆ satisfies
qˆ /∈
([
1 +
(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1
,
[
1 +
(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1)
with probability 1.
Proof. We only show that
qˆ /∈
[
1
2
,
γ(1− β)
γ(1− 2β) + β
)
(6.7)
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since the proof for the other half of the interval is symmetrical. Let Ω represent the
set of all possible sample paths of the equilibrium of this game. Let Ω′ = {ω ∈ Ω :
qn(ω) is a convergent sequence }. The set Ω′ has measure 1 because qn is a non-negative
martingale. For any  > 0, let Ω′() = {ω ∈ Ω′ : qˆ(ω) ∈ [1+3γ
6
,
γ(1−β)
γ(1−2β)+β + ]}. Suppose,
for the sake of contradiction, that the support of qˆ does not satisfy Eq. (6.7). Then,
there exists some  > 0 such that P(ω ∈ Ω′()) > 0.
For any sample path ω ∈ Ω′(), let N(ω) be such that qn(ω) ∈ [1+2γ4 ,
γ(1−β)
γ(1−2β)+β +

2
] for
all n ≥ N(ω). Let W(ω) be the set of all n such that xn(ω) = 0. By the Borel-Cantelli
Lemma, the set W(ω) contains infinitely many elements except for a set of events of
measure zero. Let Ω′′() ⊆ Ω′() be the subset of events where W(ω) contains infinitely
many elements. We now show that for any  > 0, the set Ω′′() is empty, therefore
producing a contradiction.
The bulk of the proof is to show that there exists some function K such that for any
n ≥ N(ω) and n ∈ W(ω),
qn(ω)− qn+1(ω) ≥ K() > 0. (6.8)
In words, it means that when the belief qn(ω) is in [
1+2γ
4
,
γ(1−β)
γ(1−2β)+β +

2
], an action
xn(ω) = 0 will ’reduce’ the social belief by at least K(). Since there are infinitely
many n ∈ W ∩ {n ≥ N(ω)}, Eq. (6.8) implies that the sequence qn(ω) is not Cauchy.
This contradicts the fact that the sequence qn(ω) converges, therefore implying that
ω /∈ Ω′′(). This proves that Ω′′() = ∅.
We now prove Eq. (6.8). To prove it, we show that for any n ∈ N and any sample
path ω, if xn(ω) = 0 and qn(ω) ∈ [1+2γ4 ,
γ(1−β)
γ(1−2β)+β +

2
], then Eq. (6.8) holds. For the rest
of the proof, we consider a fixed sample path ω and, to simplify notation, we suppress
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the (ω) from qn and xn. Let x
n−1 = (x1, ..., xn−1). Using Bayes’ Rule twice,
qn+1 = P(θ = 1|xn = 0, xn−1) =
[
1 +
P(xn−1|θ = 0)
P(xn−1|θ = 1)
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 0)
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 1)
]−1
=
[
1 +
(
1
qn
− 1
)
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 0)
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 1)
]−1
. (6.9)
To obtain Eq. (6.8) from Eq. (6.9), we need to lower bound the ratio P(xn=0|x
n−1,θ=0)
P(xn=0|xn−1,θ=1) .
Using Lemma 12 and subsequently conditioning on tn, we obtain that for any j ∈ {0, 1},
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = j) = P
(
pn ≤ tn(1− qn)
tn(1− 2qn) + qn
∣∣∣∣xn−1, θ = j)
=
∫ γ
t=γ
P
(
pn ≤ t(1− qn)
t(1− 2qn) + qn
∣∣∣∣xn−1, θ = j, tn = t) dH(t).
Since qn is a deterministic function of x
n−1, and tn and pn are independent (conditionally
on θ),
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = j) =
∫ γ
t=γ
P
(
pn ≤ t(1− qn)
t(1− 2qn) + qn
∣∣∣∣qn, θ = j) dH(t)
=
∫ γ
t=γ
Gj
(
t(1− qn)
t(1− 2qn) + qn
)
dH(t).
Therefore, the ratio that we need to lower bound from Eq. (6.9) is
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 0)
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 1) =
∫ γ
t=γ
G0
(
t(1−qn)
t(1−2qn)+qn
)
dH(t)∫ γ
t=γ
G1
(
t(1−qn)
t(1−2qn)+qn
)
dH(t)
.
We now consider two cases. If qn ≥ γ, we obtain that
t(1− qn)
t(1− 2qn) + qn ≤
1
2
for all t ∈ [γ, γ].
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From Lemma 3(c), we know that the ratio G0(r)G1(r) is nonincreasing and thus, if qn ≥ γ,
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 0)
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 1) ≥
G0 (1/2)
G1 (1/2)
. (6.10)
Now we consider the case where qn < γ. We also have qn ≥ 1+2γ4 ≥ γ. We can thus
break the numerator into two components,
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 0)
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 1) =
∫ qn
t=γ
G0
(
t(1−qn)
t(1−2qn)+qn
)
dH(t) +
∫ γ
t=qn
G0
(
t(1−qn)
t(1−2qn)+qn
)
dH(t)∫ γ
t=γ
G1
(
t(1−qn)
t(1−2qn)+qn
)
dH(t)
.
From Lemma 3(c), we know that the ratio G0(r)G1(r) is nonincreasing and strictly greater
than 1 over the interval (β, β). Notice that for any fixed qn, the fraction
t(1−qn)
t(1−2qn)+qn is
increasing in t and, in particular, for t = qn the fraction attains the value 1/2. Hence,
we obtain that
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 0)
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 1)
≥
∫ qn
t=γ
(
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
)
G1
(
t(1−qn)
t(1−2qn)+qn
)
dH(t) +
∫ γ
t=qn
G1
(
t(1−qn)
t(1−2qn)+qn
)
dH(t)∫ γ
t=γ
G1
(
t(1−qn)
t(1−2qn)+qn
)
dH(t)
= 1 +
(
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
− 1
) ∫ qn
t=γ
G1
(
t(1−qn)
t(1−2qn)+qn
)
dH(t)∫ γ
t=γ
G1
(
t(1−qn)
t(1−2qn)+qn
)
dH(t)
.
Note that the denominator of the previous equation can be at most 1. Therefore, we
can relax this inequality and obtain
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 0)
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 1) ≥ 1 +
(
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
− 1
)∫ qn
t=γ
G1
(
t(1− qn)
t(1− 2qn) + qn
)
dH(t).
We can further relax this inequality by only considering t ≥ qn(2β+1)
3−2qn−2β+4βqn . This partic-
ular value is chosen to guarantee that t(1−qn)
t(1−2qn)+qn ≥
2β+1
4
, which is useful because for any
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r ≥ 2β+1
4
, G1(r) ≥ G1(2β+14 ) > 0.
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 0)
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 1)
≥ 1 +
(
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
− 1
)∫ qn
t=
qn(2β+1)
3−2qn−2β+4βqn
G1
(
t(1− qn)
t(1− 2qn) + qn
)
dH(t)
≥ 1 +
(
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
− 1
)∫ qn
t=
qn(2β+1)
3−2qn−2β+4βqn
G1
(
2β + 1
4
)
dH(t)
= 1 +
(
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
− 1
)
G1
(
2β + 1
4
)[
H (qn)−H
(
qn(2β + 1)
3− 2qn − 2β + 4βqn
)]
.
To complete the bound, we just need to take a worst-case approach with respect to the
value of qn, that is, construct a bound that works for any qn ∈ ∆ = [1+2γ4 ,
γ(1−β)
γ(1−2β)+β +

2
],
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 0)
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 1)
≥ 1 +
(
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
− 1
)
G1
(
2β + 1
4
)
inf
q∈∆
[
H (q)−H
(
q(2β + 1)
3− 2q − 2β + 4βq
)]
.
Note that the interval [/2, 1− /2] is compact and the function H is continuous. There-
fore, the infimum attains its minimum,
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 0)
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 1)
≥ 1 +
(
G0(1/2)
G1(1/2)
− 1
)
G1
(
2β + 1
4
)
min
q∈∆
[
H (q)−H
(
q(2β + 1)
3− 2q − 2β + 4βq
)]
.
Since H has full support (it’s strictly increasing),
min
q∈∆
[
H (q)−H
(
q(2β + 1)
3− 2q − 2β + 4βq
)]
> 0.
Combining this result for qn < β and Eq. (6.10) for q ≥ β, we obtain that for any  > 0,
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there exists some K ′() > 0 such that
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 0)
P(xn = 0|xn−1, θ = 1) ≥ 1 +K
′().
Plugging this result into Eq. (6.9), we obtain
qn+1 ≤
[
1 +
(
1
qn
− 1
)
(1 +K ′())
]−1
.
Hence,
qn − qn+1 ≥ qn −
[
1 +
(
1
qn
− 1
)
(1 +K ′())
]−1
=
qnK
′()− q2nK ′()
1 +K ′()− qnK ′() ≥
qnK
′()
1− qnK ′() ≥
K ′()
2− K ′() > 0.
Let K() = K
′()
2−K′() to obtain Eq. (6.8), thus completing the proof.
The lemma above says that the limiting social belief qˆ is sufficiently informative that
it leads agents to disregard their private beliefs. The lemma below, on the other hand,
is an upper bound on the informativeness of qˆ. It says that if both private beliefs and
preferences are bounded, then qˆ will not approach 0 or 1, that is, the social belief will
not be completely informative about the state.
Lemma 15 Assume that B(n) = {1, ..., n− 1} for all n ∈ N. The limiting social belief
qˆ satisfies
qˆ /∈
[
0,
[
1 +
(
1− β
β
)(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1)
⋃([
1 +
(
1− β
β
)(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1
, 1
]
with probability 1.
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Proof. Let
q =
[
1 +
(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1
.
If qn < q for some n, then xn = 0 with probability 1, and thus qk = qn for all k ≥ n,
implying that qˆ = qn. If qn ≥ q,
P(θ = 1|qn, xn = 0) =
1 + ( 1
qn
− 1
) ∫ G0 ( t(1−qn)t(1−2qn)+qn) dH(t)∫
G1
(
t(1−qn)
t(1−2qn)+qn
)
dH(t)
−1
≥
[
1 +
(
1
qn
− 1
)
sup
r∈(β,β)
G0(r)
G1(r)
]−1
=
[
1 +
(
1
qn
− 1
)(
1− β
β
)]−1
,
where the last equality follows from the Lemma 3(c). Hence, if qn ≥ q,
P(θ = 1|qn, xn = 0) ≥
[
1 +
(
1
q
− 1
)(
1− β
β
)]−1
,
thus proving the desired result. For the upper interval, a symmetric proof applies.
The bound is tight in the following sense: in the most basic model of Bikchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) [cf. page 996], with γ = γ = 1/2 and two symmetric signals
(thus β = 1−β), in the equilibrium where indifferent agents follow their private signals,
we obtain that qˆ satisfies
qˆ ∈
{[
1 +
(
1− β
β
)(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1
,
[
1 +
(
1− β
β
)(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1}
.
This is true because the social belief follows a Markov Chain with 5 states in this example.
The states represent the number of private signals in favor of state 1 minus the number
of signals in favor of state 0, with the values -2 and +2 being absorbing states. In the
same game, if we consider the equilibrium where agents follow their social beliefs when
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indifferent, we obtain that all agents copy the action of agent 1 and qˆ satisfies
qˆ ∈
{[
1 +
(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1
,
[
1 +
(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1}
.
We now define a property of the signal structure and preference distribution that
enables us to characterize exactly the random variable qˆ.
Definition 11 The social belief is monotonic in the observations if
(
1
q
− 1
) ∫ G0 ( t(1−q)t(1−2q)+q) dH(t)∫
G1
(
t(1−q)
t(1−2q)+q
)
dH(t)
and
(
1
q
− 1
) 1− ∫ G0 ( t(1−q)t(1−2q)+q) dH(t)
1− ∫ G1 ( t(1−q)t(1−2q)+q) dH(t)
are non-increasing functions of q.
Lemma 16 Assume that B(n) = {1, ..., n − 1} for all n ∈ N. If the social belief is
monotonic in the observations, then the limiting social belief qˆ satisfies
qˆ /∈
[
0,
[
1 +
(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1)⋃([
1 +
(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1
, 1
]
with probability 1.
Proof. For
q =
[
1 +
(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1
,
we get that ∫
G0
(
t(1−q)
t(1−2q)+q
)
dH(t)∫
G1
(
t(1−q)
t(1−2q)+q
)
dH(t)
= 1.
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Therefore, by the monotonicity of social beliefs, if q ≥ q, we have that
1 + (1
q
− 1
) ∫ G0 ( t(1−q)t(1−2q)+q) dH(t)∫
G1
(
t(1−q)
t(1−2q)+q
)
dH(t)
−1
≥
1 + (1
q
− 1
) ∫ G0 ( t(1−q)t(1−2q)+q) dH(t)∫
G1
(
t(1−q)
t(1−2q)+q
)
dH(t)
−1 = q.
Therefore, for qn ≥ q, we have that P(θ = 1|qn, xn = 0) ≥ q. Since P(θ = 1|qn, xn = 1) ≥
qn, we obtain that qn ≥ q for all n. A symmetric argument yields the upper interval.
To connect the results concerning the limiting social belief qˆ and the measure of
learning used throughout the thesis, asymptotic learning, we need the define the following
two quantities. Let
gL(β, β, γ, γ) =
(−γ + β)β(−1 + γ)
−γγβ + γβ + γβγ − γββ − βγ + βγβ
and let gH(β, β, γ, γ) =
(−γβ + 2γββ − γβ + β − ββ)β(1− γ − β + βγ)
−γβ2 + γβ2γ + 2γβ2β + 2γββ2γ − 2γβ2βγ − γβ2β2 − β2γγ + β2γ − 2β2γβ + β2γβ2
.
The following theorem shows that the quantity gL(β, β, γ, γ) lower bounds the amount
of learning, limn→∞ Pσ(xn = θ), possible for a given support of the private beliefs and
distribution of private preferences. It arises when the limiting social belief qˆ takes values
as close as possible to 1/2. Conversely, when the limiting social belief qˆ takes values as
close to 0 and 1 as possible, the social belief is at its most informative about the state
θ and limn→∞ Pσ(xn = θ) takes the highest value possible, gH(β, β, γ, γ).
Theorem 8 Assume that B(n) = {1, ..., n − 1} for all n ∈ N. Then, the limiting
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probability of an optimal action conditional on the state is bounded by
gL(β, β, γ, γ) ≤ lim
n→∞
Pσ(xn = θ) ≤ gH(β, β, γ, γ).
Furthermore, if social belief is monotonic in the observations then
lim
n→∞
Pσ(xn = θ) = gL(β, β, γ, γ).
Proof. Combining the results of Lemmas 14 and 15, we obtain that the limiting social
belief qˆ satisfies
qˆ /∈
[[
1 +
(
1− β
β
)(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1
,
[
1 +
(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1]⋃
[[
1 +
(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1
,
[
1 +
(
1− β
β
)(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1]
.
The limiting social belief is least informative when it takes values closest to 1/2, that is,
qˆ ∈
{[
1 +
(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1
,
[
1 +
(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1}
. (6.11)
and most informative when it takes values closest to 0 and 1, that is,
qˆ ∈
{[
1 +
(
1− β
β
)(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1
,
[
1 +
(
1− β
β
)(
β
1− β
)(
1− γ
γ
)]−1}
.
(6.12)
If, for any given agent n, her social belief qn satisfies qn ≤
[
1 +
(
β
1−β
)(
1−γ
γ
)]−1
, then she
will disregard her private belief and select xn = 0. Similarly, if qn ≥
[
1 +
(
β
1−β
)(
1−γ
γ
)]−1
,
agent n will select xn = 1. Since the sequence social beliefs {qn} converges with prob-
ability 1 to qˆ and qˆ satisfies Lemma 15, for almost every realization, the sequence of
decisions {xn} will converge with probability 1. In a realization where qˆ < 1/2, the
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sequence {xn} will converge to 0 and, conversely, if qˆ > 1/2 in a given realization, the
sequence {xn} will converge for that realization to 1. Therefore,
lim
n→∞
Pσ(xn = θ) =
1
2
[Pσ(qˆ < 1/2|θ = 0) + Pσ(qˆ > 1/2|θ = 1)] .
If the support of qˆ contains only two points, such as in Eqs. (6.11) and (6.12), the
following martingale equalities [see Breiman, Theorem 5.14] allow us to compute Pσ(qˆ <
1/2|θ = 0) and Pσ(qˆ > 1/2|θ = 1).
Eσ
[
1− qˆ
qˆ
∣∣∣∣θ = 1] = Eσ [ qˆ1− qˆ
∣∣∣∣θ = 0] = 1,
We thus obtain that if the support of qˆ is given by Eq. (6.11), then limn→∞ Pσ(xn =
θ) = gL(β, β, γ, γ) and if the support of qˆ is given by Eq. (6.12), then limn→∞ Pσ(xn =
θ) = gH(β, β, γ, γ).
In Lemma 16, we show that social beliefs monotonic in the observations guarantee
that the limiting social belief qˆ will support closest to 1/2 and, therefore, qˆ will attain
its least informative values.
Both gL(β, β, γ, γ) and gH(β, β, γ, γ) are increasing in γ and decreasing in γ. There-
fore, the more diverse the preferences are, the higher will be both the lower and upper
bounds on limn→∞ Pσ(xn = θ). The final corollary shows that in the case where prefer-
ences are most diverse (unbounded preferences), asymptotic learning occurs.
Corollary 4 Assume that B(n) = {1, ..., n−1} for all n ∈ N. If either the private beliefs
or the preferences are unbounded, then asymptotic learning will occur in equilibrium
σ ∈ Σ∗.
Proof. This result follows immediately from Theorem 8 since gL(β, β, γ, γ) = 1 if
β = 1− β = 0 or γ = 1− γ = 0.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this thesis, we studied the problem of Bayesian (equilibrium) learning over a general
social network. A large social learning literature, pioneered by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer
and Welch (1992), Banerjee (1992) and Smith and Sorensen (2000), has studied equilibria
of sequential-move games, where each individual observes all past actions. The focus has
been on whether equilibria lead to aggregation of information (and thus to asymptotic
learning).
In many relevant situations, individuals obtain their information not by observing
all past actions, but from their “social network”. This raises the question of how the
structures of social networks in which individuals are situated affects learning behavior.
To address these questions, we formulated a sequential-move equilibrium learning model
over a general social network.
In our model, each individual receives a signal about the underlying state of the
world and observes the past actions of a stochastically-generated neighborhood of in-
dividuals. The stochastic process generating the neighborhoods defines the network
topology. The signal structure determines the conditional distributions of the signals
received by each individual as a function of the underlying state. The social network
consists of the network topology and the signal structure. Each individual then chooses
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one of two possible actions depending on his posterior beliefs given his signal and the
realized neighborhood. We characterized pure-strategy (perfect Bayesian) equilibria for
arbitrary stochastic and deterministic social networks, and characterized the conditions
under which there is asymptotic learning. Asymptotic learning corresponds to individual
decisions converging (in probability) to the right action as the social network becomes
large.
Two concepts turn out to be crucial in determining whether there will be asymp-
totic learning. The first is common with the previous literature. Following Smith and
Sorensen (2000), we say that private beliefs are bounded if the likelihood ratio implied
by individual signals is bounded and there is a maximum amount of information that
can be generated from these signals. Conversely, private beliefs are unbounded if the
corresponding likelihood ratio is unbounded. The second important concept is that of
expanding or nonexpanding observations. A network topology has nonexpanding ob-
servations if there exists infinitely many agents observing the actions of only a finite
subset of (excessively influential) agents. Most network topologies feature expanding
observations.
Nonexpanding observations do not allow asymptotic learning, since there exists in-
finitely many agents who do not receive sufficiently many observations to be able to
aggregate information.
One of our main theorems shows that expanding observations and unbounded pri-
vate signals are sufficient to ensure asymptotic learning. Since expanding observations
is a relatively mild restriction, to the extent that unbounded private beliefs constitute
a good approximation to the informativeness of individual signals, this result implies
that all equilibria feature asymptotic learning applies in a wide variety of settings. An-
other implication is that asymptotic learning is possible even when there are “influential
agents” or “information leaders”, that is, individuals who are observed by many, most
or even all agents (while others may be observed not at all or much less frequently). It is
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only when individuals are excessively influential—loosely speaking when they act as the
sole source of information for infinitely many agents—that asymptotic learning ceases
to apply.
We also provide a partial converse to this result, showing that under the most com-
mon deterministic or stochastic network topologies, bounded beliefs imply no asymptotic
learning. However, we show that asymptotic learning is possible even with bounded be-
liefs for a certain class of stochastic network topologies. These networks feature infinitely
many agents observing the actions of a group of agents that are not sufficiently persuasive
and, therefore, always use their private signals to make decisions.
Finally, we explore the role of the diversity of preferences on asymptotic learning.
We show that, in a network topology where each agent observe only the actions of a
single neighbor, heterogeneous preferences make the agents’ inference problem harder,
and therefore, hinders observational learning. On the other hand, when agents observe
the entire history of past actions, diverse preferences enhance the agents’ ability to learn
the state.
We believe the framework developed here opens new ways to analyze how the struc-
ture of social networks affects learning dynamics and the process of information aggre-
gation in large societies. A fascinating question that we do not address in this thesis
is whether it is possible for a social planner to influence the learning process by mod-
ifying the network structure and what would be the optimal way to achieve it. Some
other very interesting questions that can be studied by building on this framework are
the following: equilibrium learning when the underlying state is changing dynamically;
information dynamics when there is a mix of communication (of signals or beliefs) and
observation of actions; the influence of a subset of a social network (for example, the
media or interested parties) in influencing the views of the rest as a function of the
network structure.
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